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

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

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

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

THE FRIARS MINOR AND THE SECOND COUNCIL OF LYONS PAGE 5



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

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

The Seraphic Spirit of Learning





Saint Bonaventure entreats us to cleanse our mind through prayer to + Christ Crucified that we may know there can be

No reading without unction

No speculation without devotion

No investigation without admiration

No observation without exultation

+ No industry without piety +

No knowledge without love

No understanding without humility

No study without divine grace

No reflection in the soul without

+ divinely-inspired wisdom +

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MAY THE LORD GIVE YOU HIS PEACE

"Christianity does not tremble before discussion, but before ignorance." With this penetrating observation, St. Pius X. uncovered a basic truth which might almost be regarded as the inspiration for our new magazine.

We, as students of Theology, are convinced of the necessity of a "great conversation", so to speak. From our own experience, we believe that many truths found in the course of studying the sapiential science demand fuller consideration and further attention. We would like to express them, not only to inform others, but also to see what others may think.

Our primary purpose in publishing INTEREST is to enliven our own interest in Theology. As Fr. M. D. Chenu has said: "Theology is not just a collection of "opinions"; a kind of open forum for the faithful, as a liberalism lacking in truth and in freedom sometimes imagines it; it remains a knowledge, with its power to conclude, in thought and in deed."

Nothing becomes a part of a person unless he sits down and works over a problem, considering all its aspects, then writes it down to see if his thought is clear. Personal experience testifies to this.

In line with this purpose, we thought it would be beneficial to allow pertinent criticisms of any ideas or conclusions in the articles printed. We invite your responses, hoping to be able to answer them, and, if unable, to have the integrity to print them. Knowledge does arise from the realization of one's error, and the humility involved in such an admission can even make the task virtuous.

We shall now let INTEREST speak for itself.

Thank you,
The Editors

Celestine L. Leary, O. F. M.
Noel A. Fitzpatrick, O. F. M.
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reprinted 1961 by Holy Name College.

INTEREST is published twice a year for seminary and collegiate libraries by the Franciscan clerics in cooperation with the faculty of Holy Name College; Rev. Patrick J. Howard, O.F.M., Rector.

Indexed in the Catholic Periodical Index

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IN OUR TRADITION

ROY M. GASNICK, O.F.M.

There was a time -- the first few decades following the publication of Pope Leo XIII's Aeterni Patris -- when the only adherents to Duns Scotus and his school were the Franciscans. It was not always so, and, fortunately, it is not so today. We say fortunately, because we believe that the Scotistic school holds the key to the inevitable new synthesis of Catholic theology, a synthesis which, in the words of Fr. Emile Mersch, S.J., "will make us see in the center of all dogmas one sole and same truth." According to Msgr. Ceriani, in his Dottrina e vita del Corpo Mistico, the new synthesis is already "in the air." What is the key to this new synthesis? The doctrine of the absolute primacy of Christ.

In the past, the Scotistic School enjoyed great repute. Its two foundational principles -- the primacy of Christ, and the primacy of love -- were the principles from which it deduced the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception, a doctrine once denied by the great scholastic theologians, including St. Thomas, and now a dogma of the Church.

The work of the Franciscan school did not end with Ineffabilis Deus. The dogma of the Immaculate Conception was merely the necessary consequence of the Franciscan synthesis, and it was this synthesis based on the doctrine of the absolute primacy of Christ that the school had set out to establish. This doctrine was explicitly taught by three Doctors of the Church: St. Albert the Great, a Dominican; St. Laurence of Brindisi, a Capuchin; and St. Francis of Sales. Among the other great luminaries of the past who held and taught the fundamental principle of the Franciscan school were St. Bernadine of Siena, St. John Capistran, Blessed Raymond Lull, Jean Gerson, Cardinal Newman, Fr. Faber. Cardinal Deschamps and Dom Gueranger, O.S.B. (Cf. Leonard Bello, O.F.M., The Primacy and Sovereignty of Christ, in Acta Minorum, LII, 293ff).

But that is the past. What about the present? As we mentioned above, there was a lull in Scotistic activity after the promulgation of the Aeterni Patris and the Code of Canon Law. Literally interpreting the authority of St. Thomas propounded in these two documents, theologians eschewed the Scotistic school, and some, unfortunately, went so far as to accuse it of diverging from the mainstream of contemporary Catholic thought and even from the teaching of the magisterium itself.

But Pope Leo XIII hastened to inform the Minister General of the Franciscans that his encyclical by no means excluded the Franciscan school (A.S.S., XXXI, 264). Cardinal Pacelli not only taught the Franciscan doctrine of the primacy of Christ (Discorsi e Panegirici, p. 633), but, as Pope, imposed the Franciscan school on the whole Order, (Cf. Art. 238 of the General Constitutions of the Friars Minor, approved by Pius XII in 1953 in forma specifica).

The theological rigidity which ran through the first forty years of our century is beginning to relax. The latest dogma manuals no longer perpetuate the terse theological note, "communiter, contra Scotistas." And today one can pick up an issue of Theological Studies and find, happily, a non-Franciscan defense of Scotus and his school. Fr. Philip S. Hurley, S.J., for example, wrote in the Dec. 1959 issue (p. 638):

> It is a rather cavalier treatment of a great theologian and one whose adherents today occupy an honored place in the Church to say: "After St. Thomas, the only name to remember is that of Duns Scotus. And even the originality of the 'subtle doctor' often consists in misconstruing the theses of St. Thomas." The recurrence of such offhand comments does little to increase objectivity and leaves a strong impression of bias. St. Thomas is an illustrious witness to tradition. He is not the magisterium.

Another stereotype of Scotus quickly disappearing is that of the "attacker" of St. Thomas. Scotus' true place in the history of theology is again being brought into focus. Fr. Gerard Gilleman, S.J. makes this point in his, The Primacy of Charity in Moral Theology (p. 130):

> The Franciscan theology of love, instead of being opposed to the doctrine of St. Thomas on these points, has happily developed them to explicitness. In fact, it has recast and broadened Aristotelianism in a perspective far more consistent with the Christian revelation of liberty and love.

And what about the future? The future is bright for the Scotistic school. All indications point to that. Our expanding notion of the cosmos, for example, demands the cosmic Christ presented by the Scotistic synthesis. Whether one agrees with the concrete application of the theories of Teilhard de Chardin, he nevertheless points out the need for a dynamic, optimistic, and Christo-centric theological synthesis of Christian revelation, which, although in different terminology, is already presented by the Scotistic school.

We believe that the future will show that Scotus is, in the words of the Jesuit Gerard Manley Hopkins:

> . . . the rarest-veined unraveller; a not
> Rivalled insight, be rival Italy or Greece.
> (Duns Scotus's Oxford)

Need we point out that Italy stands for Aquinas, and Greece represents Aristotle?

For the present, however, we will walk with another poet, the Trappist Thomas Merton, and with him we shall,

> . . . open the book of Duns Scotus
> To learn the reason for theology.
> (Hymn for the Feast of Duns Scotus)

THE INFLUENCE OF THE FRIARS MINOR IN THE SECOND COUNCIL OF LYONS (1274)

KEVIN EUGENE FITZGERALD, O.F.M.

Pre-Conciliar Preparations

The Chair of Peter had been vacant since the death of Pope Clement IV on November 29, 1268. The Cardinals assembled at Viterbo had not been able to agree on a successor to Clement. This delay had extended to the embarrassing length of thirty-four months and was becoming an occasion of scandal to the whole Christian world as well as a source of detriment to the interests of the Church. To prevent any further evil consequences, the saintly and learned Minister General of the Order of Friars Minor, Bonaventure, was asked to propose a worthy successor to the Papal throne. So eloquent was his discourse on the merits of Theobald Visconti, Archdeacon of Liege, that the Cardinals unanimously elected the prelate on September 1, 1271.

Theobald, at the time of his election, was serving as chaplain to the armies of the Crusade in the Holy Land. On leaving the Port of St. John of the Acre to return to Rome, the Papal-designate spoke the prophetic words which were to be realized in his Pontificate: "If I forget thee, O Jerusalem, let my right hand be forgotten! Let my tongue cleave to my palate, if I remember thee not, if I place not Jerusalem above all my joy" (Psalm 136:5,6). The work of the zealous Pontiff indicated well how such a choice was to profit the Church.(1)

Not a week had passed since his coronation as Pope Gregory X when the new Pontiff announced in his Bull Salvator Noster of April 1, 1272 that an Ecumenical Council would be held at Lyons on May 1, 1274. The three issues to be treated were these: the reunion of the Schismatic Greeks with the Roman See, the recovery of the Holy Land, and the institution of needed reforms. Providentially, an envoy arrived from Constantinople a few weeks later bearing a letter from the Greek Emperor, Michael Paleologus, who expressed his desire to see the end of the schism. The envoy who delivered this welcome news was the Friar Minor, John Parastron (also known as John of Balastri, John of Constantinople). Being of Greek birth, he spoke fluent Greek and Latin and had been stationed at Constantinople for the express purpose of fostering harmonious relations between East and West.(2) This most zealous Friar is probably the most significant figure in the diplomatic proceedings between Pope Gregory and Michael Paleologus. Not only was he able to contribute much toward furnishing rapport for the development of the union, but he was also to play a prominent part in the activities of the Council itself. We shall treat of this latter point subsequently.

Inspired by this conciliatory letter, the Pope called upon the extraordinary talents and prestige of Saint Bonaventure: "As General of the Franciscan Order, his power was very considerable, but it was greatly increased by his reputation for learning and profound piety. The Order had already spread into almost every country of the Old World. In the East and the West it possessed thirty-three provinces and four vicariates. It had penetrated into Egypt, Palestine, and Syria and was firmly established all over Europe including the British Isles."(3)

The day after Gregory invited the Greek Emperor and Joseph, the Patriarch of Constantinople, to the Council, he commissioned Bonaventure to appoint four Friars Minor as papal legates to Constantinople (October 25, 1272).(4) The Friars chosen as envoys were Jerome Massi of Ascoli, Raymond Beranger, Bonagratia of St. John in Persiceto, and Bonaventure of Mugello. The leader of the delegation, Jerome of Ascoli, had been Minister Provincial of the Slavonic Province at the time of his appointment. This distinguished Friar was to become Bonaventure's successor as General of the Order on May 20, 1274, and five years later, was to be made a Cardinal. Moreover, in 1288, he was to be elected Supreme Pontiff under the name of Nicholas IV, becoming the first Franciscan elevated to the Papacy.(5)

Bonagratia of St. John in Persiceto was to succeed Jerome of Ascoli as Minister General in 1279. In this office, he obtained from Pope Nicholas III the promulgation of the Bull Exiit qui seminat, which gave an official explanation of the Rule of Saint Francis. Zealous for the observance of the Rule and for the welfare of the Missions in the Orient, Bonagratia died at Avignon in 1283.(6)

The Seraphic Doctor, meanwhile, had returned to the University of Paris to deliver his lectures (collationes) on the six days of Creation (the Hexaemeron). Based on the Scriptures, these twenty-three lectures treat of truths of dogmatic and mystical theology and were intended mainly to refute certain Averroistic tendencies gaining ground among the students at the University. In the course of these lectures, Bonaventure received notice that he was to be made the Cardinal-Archbishop of Albano.(7) Eight years previously, Pope Clement IV had designated him for the Archbishopric of York in England. So earnestly had Bonaventure requested to be relieved of this onus honoris that Clement acquiesced. This time, however, the voice of Peter's successor was formally imperative

--there was no room for choice. The exigencies of the times would require the services of the capable Franciscan theologian and administrator. Resigned to the will of God, Bonaventure left the halls of Paris and returned to Italy. It is worthy of note that the Seraphic Doctor was given Albano as his Episcopal See for this See was customarily assigned only to one of the senior Cardinals. Even today, the suburbicarian See of Albano is granted only to a Cardinal-Bishop of the Sacred College.(8)

After a short stay at the Franciscan monastery in Mugello, Bonaventure joined the Pope at Florence to reside with him as was the custom at that time. In September of 1273, the Pope and his entourage travelled through Modeno, Reggio, Parma, Piacenza Lodi, Milan, and Chambery in Savoy, whence they arrived at Lyons early in November.(9) At Mass on the First Sunday of Advent, Bonaventure preached an eloquent sermon before the Pope, many Cardinals, and the whole Curia.(10) Shortly afterwards (November 11th or 12th) he was consecrated a Bishop by Pope Gregory himself.(11) Subsequent to his consecration, we hear little of Bonaventure's activities until the beginning of the Council. No doubt, he had already been commissioned by the Pope to prepare and organize the agenda for the Council.(12)

The four Franciscan envoys had embarked for Constantinople at the end of October, 1272. Having arrived and informed the Greek Emperor of the purpose of their mission, they remained at the Court for several months carrying on negotiations. Michael Paleologus wrote a second time to the Pope assuring him of his affection toward the Holy See and promising the immediate return of part of the papal legation. On November 25, 1273, Gregory exhorted Friars Jerome and Bonagratia, who had remained at Constantinople with John Parastron, to hasten the happy issue of their assignment and to return to Lyons with the imperial delegation. Anticipating that their return voyage was to be a slow one, the Pope sent another letter which contained a formula of faith and submission to the Roman Catholic Church to be presented to Michael Paleologus. The latter subscribed to the formula without delay, and notice of this was sent to the Pope sometime in April. It was John of Parastron who figured significantly in the Emperor's compliance with the formula of faith. For it was he who explained certain rules of faith to Michael Paleologus after having translated the Papal document into Greek. "The brother John mentioned in the text subscribed to by M. Paleologus is the Franciscan John Parastron (of Balastri)....One can suppose that, after having seen the character of his assignment and his knowledge of both Greek and Latin, he is likewise the author of the Greek translation of the profession of faith, and the words, 'as brother John has explained to us' contained in the text of the formula are a sort of signature."(13) John was not only the interpreter for the Greek Emperor at Constantinople but was also to be the interpreter for the Greek prelates at the Council.(14) Before leaving the Orient in May, Friars Jerome and Bonagratia sent another letter to Pope Gregory assuring him of the success of their mission. The Friars had acquitted themselves well of their difficult and delicate assignment.

Assisting Saint Bonaventure at the Council were other Franciscan prelates: Odo Rigaud (Rigaldus, Rigault), Archbishop of Rouen, and Paul Conti, Bishop of Tripoli in Syria. Odo Rigaud was a noted dialectician and lecturer at the University of Paris. The Franciscan historian, Thomas Eccleston, honors him as being "a great and wonderful philosopher."(15) He had commented on the Sentences and had written a treatise on the visitation of parishes.(16) Consecrated Archbishop of Rouen in 1248, he led an exemplary life that earned for him the title "model of bishops." When King St. Louis of France led a Crusade to Palestine in 1270, Odo accompanied him. The holy Archbishop died in 1275, a year after the closing of the Council. Paul Conti, grandnephew of Pope Innocent II, was consecrated Bishop of Tripoli, in 1261. He died in 1285, being spared the trial of seeing his See fall into the hands of the Saracen invaders in 1288.(17)

The famous Franciscan historian, Luke Wadding, affirms that these three Franciscan prelates had been appointed by the Pope to manage the affairs of the Council: "Qui ex domini Papae jussione principaliter negotia Concilii pertractabant."(18) (Emphasis added.) The prominence and authority which they wielded seems to have aroused a certain amount of jealousy among their contemporaries. Thus we find them referred to in the following satirical triplet:

> Bonaventure, Rouen and Tripolitane
> Dispense papal laws and unmindful remain
> Of their Order which scorns all honors as vain.(19)

Such criticism, however, was not extraordinary during the thirteenth century when the Mendicant Orders of Dominic and Francis arose as the staunch defenders of faith and morals. Their tremendous influence not only with the Papacy but also with the populace did not fail to provoke envious jibes from some members of the clergy, notably the partisans of William D'Amour. It was the task of the two luminaries of the Middle Ages, Saint Thomas and Saint Bonaventure, to defend the rights of the Mendicant Orders (of which they were the outstanding representatives) against such adversaries.

Two other notable Franciscans present at the Council were John Peckam, the future Archbishop of Canterbury, and Albert Gonzaga, the Future Bishop of Ivrea. These Friars, however, had no active voice in the actual proceedings of the Council but perhaps served in some advisory capacity.

The Council (20)

The long awaited day had arrived? After a three-day fast, the Second Council of Lyons and the Fourteenth Ecumenical Council of the Church opened its first session in the Cathedral of Saint John on May 7, 1274. Vested in his pontifical robes, Pope Gregory intoned the Veni Creator Spiritus to invoke the aid of the Holy Spirit upon the Council. Preaching on the text "with desire have I desired to eat this Pasch with you" (Luke 22:15),(21) the Pontiff stated the reasons which motivated him to convoke the Council and to set forth its threefold objective. He then closed this initial session with his blessing.

Eleven days were to elapse before the beginning of the second session. During this interval, Pope Gregory personally interviewed the higher prelates from each country, and he succeeded in obtaining tithes of their ecclesiastical revenues for a period of six years to aid the Holy Land. During the second session on May 18th, the Council formulated the canon (no. 1) on the Faith in regard to the Trinity: viz, "that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father and the Son (Filioque), from one principle, from all eternity." (emphasis added) The Pope then commanded that all lower prelates and abbots not summoned nominatim to the Council were to return to their homelands. Shortly before the beginning of this latter session, the Pope had received certain letters from the Franciscan envoys in Constantinople informing him that the Greek legation was on the way to the Council. This news so delighted the Pontiff that he immediately had all the members of the Council assemble in the Cathedral. Before reading the letters, Gregory asked Bonaventure to preach. The Seraphic Doctor chose the appropriate text from Baruch (5:5): "Arise, O Jerusalem, and stand on high: and look towards the east, and behold thy children gathered together from the rising to the setting sun."

The third session convened on June 7th. The distinguished Dominican, Cardinal Peter of Tarantaise, preached on the words of Isaias (60:4): "Lift up thy eyes round about and see: all these are gathered together, they are come to thee." Twelve canons regarding reform were issued, and then the assembly was adjourned sine die for the imminent arrival of the Greeks. Consequently, the Pope permitted the members of the Council to travel any distance within a radius of six miles from the city.

On June 24th, the Greek legation of fifty archbishops and five hundred bishops or synods entered Lyons, accompanied by the Franciscan legates. It was impossible to describe the enthusiasm of all the members of the Council and the populace of Lyons. The Greeks were received with honor and were brought before the Pope who gave them the kiss of peace and other tokens of cordial welcome. Touched by his tender charity, the Greeks paid due honor to the Vicar of Christ and professed, at the same time, their fidelity to the Apostolic See.

On the feast of SS. Peter and Paul, Pope Gregory celebrated a Pontifical Mass in the Cathedral Church. The Epistle and Gospel were sung in Latin and Greek, after which Saint Bonaventure delivered a moving sermon. Then the Credo was chanted, first in Latin, then in Greek by two pontifical penitentiaries, the Patriarch Germain and the Greek Archbishops of Calabria. Arriving at the words "qui cum Patre Filioque procedit," the Eastern Prelates sang them slowly and devoutly three times as a testimony of their belief in the Catholic teaching on the Trinity.

The pontifical penitentiaries mentioned above were the Dominican William of Morbecca, famous as a translator of the Greek philosophers, and the Franciscan John of Parastron, who, as we have said already, figured so significantly in the diplomatic negotiations between Pope Gregory and the Emperor Michael Paleologus. After the Council, John was to return to his native city of Constantinople and continue in every way to manifest his respect and love for the Greek liturgy.(22)

On July 4th, the Pope received sixteen deputies of the Tartar Khan Abaga who wanted to make an alliance with the Christians against the Mohammedans. Although their coming was but a military expediency, spiritual benefits were to derive from it, as we shall see later. It is interesting to note that some of the Franciscan missionaries in the land of the Tartars had accompanied this delegation. Two days later the fourth session was begun. George Acropolite, Grand Chancellor of the Emperor Paleologus, pronounced the oath of abjuration in the name of his sovereign. The Pope then intoned the Te Deum and shed tears of joy. After two hundred twenty years of separation, the union so much desired was accomplished: "Ecce quam bonum et quam jucundum habitare fratres in unum!" Ps. 132:1)

Amidst all this jubilation, however, a cloud of sorrow was to pass over the assembly. The great champion of the Church, Bonaventure, had fallen seriously ill shortly after the fourth session. Worn out by the many labors on behalf of his Order and the more recent commitments in the Council, he passed to his eternal reward on July 15th. At the news of his death, every member of the Council was affected with



the deepest grief. The Pope mourned a faithful counsellor, the Cardinals a dear friend, the Greeks their revered "Eutychius" (the name they had given him because of his successful influence with them), and the Friars Minor their beloved father. A redactor of the acts of the Council aptly expressed Bonaventure's saintly character with these words: "(Cardinal Bonaventure) a man of eminent knowledge, and more eminent holiness; celebrated for his eloquence, sweet, affable, merciful, full of merits and virtues, beloved of God and man."(23)

We do not know what exactly was the cause of Bonaventure's death. An early chronicler of the Order relates that the Saint was poisoned.(24) This assertion, however, seems to be a singular one as Frs. Lemmens and Sparacio imply. Surely if such was the case, others would have mentioned the fact. There are other reasons for doubting the truth of this assertion. Bonaventure had lived a comparatively long life (he was fifty-three at the time of his death) if one considers the average life span of a man of the Middle Ages. Moreover, his intensely active life as a scholar, administrator, and papal counsellor would bear heavily upon the energies of any ordinary man. This latter observation is implied by one chronicler commenting on Bonaventure's death: "Fatigatus laboribus, in gravissimum incidit morbum; quo in dies, et in horas, augmentum capiente..."(25) Most significant is another

comment from a chronicler of Parma: "Magna mortalitas fuit (tempore Concilii), et obierunt ibi plures cardinales, et multi praelati, et alii sine numero."(26) From these remarks, we can rightfully conclude that some disease or plague rampant at the time of the Council hastened the mortal collapse of his already overtaxed physical constitution.

As was the custom in that time, Bonaventure's funeral (one of the largest in the history of the Church) took place on the very day of his death, July 15th. The number and quality of the persons attending the rites was indeed impressive. Among the ecclesiastical dignitaries present were Pope Gregory and more than a thousand prelates of both the Latin and Greek Rites, in addition to hundreds of priests and religious. Notable among the lay representation were the rulers of France and Aragon, ambassadors from Germany, England, Sicily, and the Grand-Master of the Knights of St. John; besides, almost the entire populace of Lyons was assembled near the church, eager to have the body of the Saint remain in their city. More than anything, the funeral service resembled a triumphal procession. The Cardinal-Bishop of Ostia, Peter of Tarantaise (the future Pope Innocent V), preached the eulogy, using the significant words of David: "I grieve for thee, Jonathan my brother." (2 Kings 1:26). Love made him eloquent as he discoursed on the virtues and merits of his saintly brother-Cardinal.

There can be no doubt that Bonaventure was the guiding spirit of the Council. His holiness and learning won the hearts and minds of everyone at the Council. It is indeed unfortunate that, of all the labors of the Seraphic Doctor in the Council, nothing has been found. We can rightly maintain, however, on the basis of sound evidence, that Bonaventure played the most important role in the Council. Considering that he was made a Cardinal and consecrated Bishop by the Pope himself is a good indication of the high regard the Pope had for him. Little is heard of Bonaventure's activities from the time of his consecration on November 11th up to the opening of the Council on May 7th. It is generally agreed that the Pope had already commissioned him to prepare the agenda and conduct the preliminary sessions. Gregory would certainly use the services of this most distinguished and holy Cardinal whose scholarly and administrative talents were universally recognized. The strongest evidence for affirming Bonaventure's unique position in the Council is based on the testimony of two Popes, Sixtus IV and Sixtus V. In the Bull proclaiming the canonization of Bonaventure, Pope Sixtus IV said: "...in Concilio Lugdunensi Praesidens, omniaque ad Dei laudem dirigens, sedatis discordiis difficultatibusque sublatis, ipsi Ecclesiae maximo usui fuit et ornamento."(27) When Saint Bonaventure was made a Doctor of the Church, Pope Sixtus V said of him: "Qui (Gregorius X) in ejus (Bonaventura) virtute et sapientia ita acquiescebat ut Concilii recte dirigendi et administrandi partes ei praecipue tribuendae esse decerneret."(28) Nothing could be more explicit than these Papal declarations. But let us add a final historical observation to confirm our assertion. The Pope and the Curia, says a chronicler, to show its esteem for the great Doctor, approved his doctrine and placed his works in the archives of the Church along with the Sacred Scriptures and the books of the holy Fathers.(29) This was indeed a worthy tribute to the Seraphic Doctor: "In medio Ecclesiae aperuit os ejus."

The following day, July 16th, the fifth session was begun. After ratifying fourteen canons regarding parochial reform, the Sovereign Pontiff rose, and, filled with emotion, spoke magnificently of the holy Doctor, expressing at the same time "how the Church of God has suffered inestimable loss in the death of Brother Bonaventure...the pilar of Christendom has fallen."(30) He then ordered all priests throughout the world to celebrate a Mass for the soul of Bonaventure.(31) After this moving Papal eulogy, one of the Tartar envoys and two of his companions were baptized by Cardinal Peter of Tarantaise.(32) Following this ceremony, an important canon was issued instituting in perpetuity the law of the Conclave. Though, unfortunately, the law was abrogated by Popes John XXI and Nicholas IV, it was re-enacted in the pontificate of Celestine V.(33)

The sixth and final session of the Council was held on July 17, 1274. Of the three objectives of the Council, two had been successfully dealt with. There remained the question of the reform of ecclesiastical discipline and, in particular, the problem of the superfluous multiplication of religious congregations with their own Rules. In the twenty-third canon, the Council laid down certain regulations restricting their further establishment while suppressing several of these religious congregations. This had been Pope Gregory's intention for more than a year before the Council opened. On March 31, 1273, he had formally declared that the Dominican and Franciscan Orders would not be among the Orders to be suppressed. Their approval stemmed from the valuable services they had rendered for the glory of God and the Church.(34) The Carmelites and Hermits of Saint Augustine were reapproved because their authorized establishment was prior to Gregory's decree.(35) We can see St. Bonaventure's posthumous influence in these enactments regarding religious orders. An ardent defender with St. Thomas of the rights of the mendicant life, he was likewise a zealous reformer of discipline in regard to his own storm-tossed Order, eradicating from its ranks the "Spiritualist" teachings of the Joachimites.(36) Not without reason is he called the "Second Founder" of the Franciscan Order. That the invaluable experience he possessed was drawn upon by the Pope and the Fathers of the Council is beyond doubt. After reciting the customary prayers and giving the apostolic blessing, Pope Gregory dismissed the Fathers of the Council and the Second Council of Lyons, the Fourteenth Ecumenical Council of the Church, was concluded. A few days afterwards, the resolution made during the conciliar sessions to recruit preachers for the Crusade was actualized when the Pope sent a Bull, Si Mentes, to all the Franciscan provinces enjoining them to appoint Friars for that purpose. A similar letter was sent the same day to the Dominican provinces.(37) On November 1, 1274, Pope Gregory published a collection of the thirty-one decrees of the Second Council of Lyons.

To treat of the complex and manifold reasons why the successes of the Council of Lyons were so short-lived is not within the scope of this paper. However, we can cite these destructive undercurrents which re-established the Schism in 1282: political expediency and contentious nationalism on the part of the East;

and on the part of the West, the imperialistic ambition of Charles of Anjou and the imprudence of certain Popes after Gregory X in attempting to enforce doctrinal discipline in the East. The efforts to recover the Holy Land were ineffectual because of the refusal of the European princes (motivated by greed and avarice) to form armies for a Crusade. Pope Nicholas IV, despite his zealous and earnest efforts, experienced the heart-breaking grief of seeing the total and final loss of the Holy Land in 1291.(38)

Though the Second Council of Lyons attained only a modicum of success in the 13th century, it has provided a wealth of experience for the 20th century. In view of the forthcoming Ecumenical Council, this experience will prove invaluable. From the West, we hear the voice of the Vicar of Christ calling to his brethren to return to the maternal bosom of the Church; from the East, we hear encouraging replies. Time has not completely healed the wounds inflicted in the past; thus, it is necessary that an atmosphere of good will be fostered so that objective issues can be discussed in earnest. For this reason, we can admire and imitate the sincere efforts of those members of the Council of Lyons and, in particular, the followers of the Seraphic Patriarch, Francis, who labored so zealously to bring peace and unity into a divided world.

NOTES

(1) "L'oeuvre du zele pontife demontra bientot combien un tel choix devait etre profitable a l'Eglise" (Eusebe Clop, O.F.M., Saint Bonaventure (Paris: Lecoffre, 1922), p.153.)

(2) Hefele-Leclerq, Histoire des Conciles (Paris: Letouzey et Ane, 1914), VI, i, 161.

(3) Laurence Costelloe, O.F.M., Saint Bonaventure (London: Longmans, Green, 1911), p.98.

(4) Opera Omnia Sancti Bonaventurae (Quaracchi, 1902), X, 61.

(5) G. Golubovich, O.F.M., Biblioteca Bio-Bibliografica della Terra Santa e dell'Ordine Francescano (Quaracchi, 1913), I, 283.

(6) "Bonagratia Fielci," Dictionnaire d'histoire et de geographie ecclesiastiques (Paris: Letouzey et Ane, 1937), IX, 722-723.

(7) "Esta promocion tuvo lugar muy probable mente el 23 de mayo de 1273" (Obras de San Buenaventura (Biblioteca de Autores Cristianos, Madrid: 1945) p.25) cites the Bull A nostrae praemotionis auspiciis of Pope Sixtus IV (Bullarium Franciscanum), ed. J. Sbaralea-Eubel. (Rome, 1759), III, 205.)

(8) Bouscaren-Ellis, Canon Law (Text and Commentary) (Milwaukee: Bruce, 1949), p. 158.

(9) A. Potthast, Regesta Pontificum Romanorum (Berlin, 1875), II, 1671; cited by L. Lemmens, O.F.M., Der Heilige Bonaventura (Munich: Koesel'schen, 1909) p.250.

(10) Ibid., IX, 37.

(11) Lemmens, op. cit., p. 250; citing Glassberger, Chronica (Analecta Franciscana) (Quaracchi, 1906), II, 85.

(12) Obras de San Buenaventura (ed. cit.), pp.23; 26-27. Cf. also Opera Omnia (ed. cit.), X, 62.

(13) V. Grumel, "Lyon (II^{e} Concile Oecumenique de)," Dictionnaire Theologie Catholique, IX, 1387.

(14) Glassberger, op. cit., III, 88; cited ibid.

(15) T. Eccleston, O.F.M., Liber de adventu Fratrum Minorum in Angliam (Analecta Franciscana), col. xi, p. 239; cited by Lemmens, op. cit., p. 57.

(16) Clop, op. cit., p. 170.

(17) Golubovich, op. cit., I, 254.

(18) Wadding, L., O.F.M., Annales Minorum (Quaracchi, 1931), ann.1274, p.451.

(19) Costelloe, op. cit., pp. 102-103.

(20) Unless otherwise noted, our treatment of the proceedings of the Council is adapted from Hefele-Leclerq, op. cit., pp. 168-180, passim.

(21) Pope Innocent III had chosen the same text for the opening session of the Fourth Lateran Council in 1215.

(22) Glassberger, op. cit.,III, 88; cited by Grumel, op. cit., col. 1390.

(23) Brevis nota eorum quae in II conc. Lugd. generali acta sunt, in Mansi, Concilia, (ed. Regia. Paris, 1644) XXVIII, pp.532-533. cited by L. Cherance, O.F.M.Cap., Saint Bonaventure (Paris: Poussielque, 1899), p. 196; also in Obras de San Buenaventura (ed. cit.), p. 28.

(24) Viz., Peregrinus of Bologna, "Chronicon de successione generalium ministrorum ordinis minorum abbreviatum," (ed. Little), Bulletino critico di cose francescane, I (1905), 46; cited by Lemmens op.cit., p.259.

(25) S. Baluzi, Miscellanea (Lucae, 1764), IV, 476ff; cited by D. Sparacio, O.F.M.Conv., Vita di S. Bonaventura (Rome: Abruzzesi, 1921), P.180.

(26) Sparacio (loc.cit.) cites a chronicler in Muratori's Rerum Italicarum Scriptores, IX, 787, in support of this statement.

(27) Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae, (ed.cit.), I, p.XLI, contains the Bull of Canonization (Superna coelestis patria of April 14, 1482) in which this quotation is found.

(28) Ibid., p. XLVII, contains the Bull proclaiming St. Bonaventure a Doctor of the Church (Triumphantis Jerusalem of March 14, 1588) in which this quotation is found. The words ei praecipue are more exact than praesidens (in the Bull Superna coelestis patria - cf. supra). Bonaventure could not have presided (if we understood the word in a strict sense) at the Council itself since we know that the Pope was present at each session. Either word denotes Bonaventure's principal role (i.e. after the Supreme Pontiff) in the Council. Citing the Obras de San Buenaventura, (ed. cit.), p.26, we find these words concerning Bonaventure's position in the Council: "Creado ya cardenalobispo de Albano, el santo Doctor fue nombrado vicario o legado del Papa en el Concilio de Lyon." The authors make this assertion on the basis of the work by B. Marinangeli, La canonizazione di S. Bonaventura which in turn cites the Miscellanea Franciscana, 1918, XVIII, 131.

(29) "Gregorio X fece vari Cardinali--inter quos fuit frater Bonaventura generalis minister Fratrum Minorum, qui erat summus magister in sacra theologia, homo sanctae vitae et multae orationis, qui plures edidit libros et praecipue IIII super sententias, quos dominus Papa cum tota curia approbavit et in archivo ecclesiae poni fecit cum aliis libris authenticis" (Fr. Eleemosyna, O.F.M., Chronica, (Paris: Bibliotheque Nationale), cod. lat. 5006, fol.108r) cited by Golubovich, op. cit., II, 125, and editors of the Obras (B.A.C. ed.), p.26.

(30) Hefele-Leclerq, op.cit., p. 180 and Obras (ed.cit.), p.28., both citing Brevis nota (ed.cit.), pp.532-533.

(31) Brevis nota, loc.cit.

(32) Hefele-Leclerq, loc.cit.

(33) Funk, F.X., Manual of Church History, (St. Louis: Herder, 1910), I, p. 334.

(34) Raab, C., O.F.M., The Twenty Ecumenical Councils of the Catholic Church, (New York: Longmans, Green, 1937), P. 109, Cf. also Obras (ed.cit.), p.27.

(35) Ibid.; cf. also Clop, op.cit., p.167.

(36) "Cuius praesentia et sapientia in illo concilio a Deo videtur in defensionem Religionum contra multos et magnos adversarios fuisse praeparata" (Analecta Franciscana, III, 701). St. Bonaventure had written five works in defense of the Mendicant Orders - cf. Cayre, Manual of Patrology, (Paris: Desclee, 1940), p.505; and Las Obras de San Buenaventura, (ed.cit.), p.20.

(37) Wadding, op.cit., ann.1274, p.463; cited by Clop, op.cit., p.167.

(38) Mourret-Thompson, A History of the Catholic Church, (St. Louis: Herder, 1941), IV, pp. 621-625.

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THE BLESSED VIRGIN MARY
and the
UNIVERSAL NECESSITY OF CONTRACTING ORIGINAL SIN

AUGUSTINE PUJOL, O.F.M.

The question of the so-called "debitum" of Original Sin in Our Lady has been given considerable attention by Mariologists in the last few years. Well-nigh fifty articles on this topic have appeared in both European and American theological magazines.(1) The papers on this problem presented at the Mariological Congress held in Rome in the autumn of 1954 fill a compact 500-page volume.(2) At the end of the same Congress, a spontaneous public discussion on this question was held among the leading Mariologists of our day.(3) If this discussion marked the climax of the literary debate, in no way can it be said to have marked the end.

What is the concrete result of all these disputations? Has all the effort and energy spent in this debate been wasted? The purpose of this paper is to show that the discussion on the "debitum" of Original Sin has shed new light upon several other basic theological problems and notions, to which this question is very closely related.

Indeed, any study on the "debitum" of Original Sin in the Blessed Virgin necessarily implies a study of her position in regard to the Universal Law of Solidarity or of Original Sin; the nature of this Law and the full import of Mary's Immaculate Conception. It likewise presupposes a study of Mary's predestination to the Divine Motherhood, and of her absolute dependence on Christ for all the graces and privileges she received; the fact of her redemption by Him, and the exact concept of Redemption. Accordingly, we shall consider, first, Mary's relation to the first Adam, and then Mary's relation to the Second Adam.

Needless to say, we cannot aim at being exhaustive in our treatment. We shall endeavor only to indicate the connections of the problem of the "debitum" with these other problems and their mutual bearing on one another.

It is a Dogma of Catholic Faith that Mary was free and exempt from all stain of sin in the very first moment of her conception, and this in virtue of the foreseen merits of Christ, the Saviour of the human race.(4) Had it not been for the grace flowing from Christ's Redemption, then, Mary would have contracted Original Sin. All theologians aggee on this, and this was the conclusion (if it may be so-called) of the Roman discussion of 1954.(5)

Were we to close our investigation at this point, we would have no problem concerning the "debitum" of Original Sin in Our Lady. But we cannot help asking ourselves just what is meant by the statement that "Mary would have contracted Original Sin if . . ." Does this mean that she should have contracted the sin? In other words, did Mary have a real necessity of contracting it? Or, rather, are we to take that statement simply in the sense of a merely "contrary-to-fact" conditional proposition? Then we would be stating only a purely hypothetical case, depending upon a condition which de facto was never realized. There is a great difference between these two alternative answers, particularly when they are considered in their respective implications in the other theological problems mentioned above.

The Meaning of "Debitum"

The term "debitum" in itself implies a real necessity. It is the substantive form designed to take the place of the proposition: "Maria debuisset contrahere peccatum originale." That is why we do not agree with those who consider this whole matter a mere dispute over words. These words do mean something definite. If we talk of a "debitum" in Mary, however much we try to lessen it, however remote we postulate it, we shall always affirm the existence in her of a real need or obligation of contracting Original Sin. And this is quite different from asserting a mere hypothetical case, a "contrary-to-fact" situation.

Although in general all theologians would accept the definition we have just given of the "debitum" as some sort of need or obligation on the part of the person, more or less proximate, of contracting Original Sin in the first moment of his existence,(6) there is no agreement as to the further clarification of the concept. We are faced with "a portentous thicket of distinctions and ratiocinations about a 'debitum proximum' or 'remotum,' material or formal, etc."(7)

Nevertheless, despite the almost infinite variety of shades of meaning, the division most commonly accepted is that between a "proximate debitum" and a "remote" one. This distinction will become clearer once we analyze the different explanations of the way Original Sin is transmitted. Temporarily, let it suffice to say that a "proximate debitum" is a necessity in the person, as such, to be deprived of sanctifying grace in the initial moment of his existence. A "remote debitum," on the other hand, does not affirm that there is such a necessity, but that there ought to be; it is a necessity to incur the necessity, so to speak, of a "debitum debiti," as it has been called.

Some authors do not accept this distinction, though, denying its usefulness. In practice, it is easy to include their opinions under one of the two recorded above.

History of the Controversy

Before we go on, let us take a glance at the actual advances registered in the discussion itself. The fact that the whole controversy has been anything but a fruitless dispute over words is attested by the significant change in opinions that has taken place as a result.

Up to the late Forties, with very few exceptions, the authors who treated the subject of the "debitum" formed two camps. But the two opinions (and the only two opinions) given were the one holding a "proximate debitum," and that holding a "remote debitum."(8) Hardly is any mention made of the possibility of a third choice: the denial of all "debitum."

In fact, most authors asserted that such an opinion "cannot be reconciled with the solemn formula by which Pope Pius IX defined the dogma of the Immaculate Conception."(9) Although Fr. Roschini records the "anti-debitist" opinion, he presents it in its most outlandish form and then dismisses it as not only unsafe, but even illogical.(10)

If, then, we turn our attention to the Roman discussion of 1954, which reflects faithfully all the different opinions aired in the literary controversy, we will be surprised to find that only one speaker stood in favor of a personal, "proximate debitum" of Original Sin in Mary,(11) and he found no follower among those there assembled. The majority of the theologians were in favor of the denial of all "debitum." Even those who defended the opinion of a "remote debitum" acknowledged that the expression "debitum peccati" is by no means a felicitous one and should be avoided.(12)

Actually, we are not witnessing an innovation. We are simply watching a return to the position that was quite common among theologians from the second half of the 17th century through the whole of the 18th.(13) The question as we have it now arose about 1540, in a controversy between Cajetan and his fellow Dominican, Catharinus. In 1615, a group of Franciscans in Toledo, particularly Fr. Francisco de Fresno and Fr. Juan de Soria, publicly defended the thesis that "the Blessed Virgin Mary did not contract the 'debitum' of Original Sin." When brought before the Inquisition, their opinion was declared safe and licit by the Supreme Tribunal of Madrid in January, 1616. The opinion spread rapidly throughout Spain and beyond its borders. Two Saints and Doctors of the Church--St. Francis de Sales and St. Alphonsus de Liguori--supported it. In the 18th Century, we have the case of the citizens of the town of Cosenza, who took an oath to defend this doctrine--even with their blood, if need be.(14)

It was only "the 17th Century prostration of Scholastic Theology and the political, intellectual and spiritual upheavals of the day" that "smothered in oblivion the countless works written to prove that the Blessed Virgin had contracted no debt of Original Sin, or almost none."(15)

I. MARY'S RELATION TO THE FIRST ADAM

It would be worthwhile first to examine what are Mary's relations to the first Adam. It is beyond any doubt that Mary is a true daughter of Adam, descending from him through normal carnal generation. Mary therefore receives from Adam her human nature, which she shares with him. By that fact, Adam can be said to be Mary's physical head, in the same sense as he is physical head of the whole human race.

We must consider now whether this fact of Mary's descent from Adam necessarily implies that Adam is also Mary's moral head, in the sense that, when he broke God's commandment, he was acting in Mary's name, as her representative, as he was ours.

Some authors build up an argument to prove a "debitum peccati" in Mary from this very fact of her descent from Adam. Thus, Plessis affirms that the "debitum" consists precisely in this, that "all those who receive human nature from Adam seminaliter (i.e., by way of carnal generation) incur the necessity of contracting Original Sin."(16) It is very easy to see how the reasoning would continue: But Mary receives human nature from Adam in this manner; therefore . . .

In order that the premise set up by Plessis be valid, it must follow that carnal descent from Adam implies per se and necessarily a real need, either of contracting Original Sin ("debitum proximum") or of being subject to the Law of Original Sin ("debitum remotum").

We maintain that such is not the case. Physical descent from Adam does not necessarily imply one's being also under his moral headship. It is due to God's disposition that Adam was constituted our moral head. Furthermore, even if a person should be under Adam's moral headship, still we could not deduce from this that such a person is under a need of contracting Original Sin, unless we can affirm that physical descent from Adam is the only, or at least the primary source of, or title to, grace for that person. This, in turn, would imply that God decided to deprive that person of sanctifying grace at conception, because of the loss of the title to grace through Adam.(17)

Let us recall a few points about the nature of Original Sin.(18) It is commonly agreed that, according to the notion first advanced by St. Anselm, Original Sin consists primarily, if not exclusively, in a privation, the initial privation of sanctifying grace. Original Sin is not to be thought of as something that came upon our human nature and, as it were, was added to it. It is rather a lack of something, a loss of something. And that something is sanctifying grace, a supernatural reality. If this privation can constitute a sin at all, it is due to God's decision to elevate mankind to a Supernatural Order. This is what first prompted God to bestow grace on Adam and Eve, and even after their fall, God refuses to withdraw His "eternal offer."(19)

Original Sin, then, belongs to the Supernatural Order, and as such it is dependent upon God's Will and positive decree. For this reason we deny that physical descent from Adam implies a necessary inclusion under his moral headship.

Again, Original Sin being a privation, the "debitum" is a need to be deprived of initial grace, as we saw before. But such a need is not possible if God has decided to give a person grace at conception on another count than that of descent from Adam. Therefore to affirm that, because a person was placed

by God under Adam's moral headship, he or she contracts the need to be deprived of initial grace, means that physical descent from Adam was the only, or at least the primary title to grace for that person.

How is Original Sin transmitted? In the light of the preceding considerations, we can conclude that physical descent from Adam cannot be the only, or the main, cause of our contracting it in our conception. God's decree in this regard is at least a partial cause, and certainly the most important, since from it the others derive their causality.

When Aldama defines the necessity implied by the "debitum" as "nothing else but a certain connection of causes (consecutio causarum) from which true Original Sin would certainly arise in Mary if Divine Preservation did not intervene,"(20) he seems to lay all the causality in the transmission of Original Sin in factors other than God and His decree.

The decree of God, which we assert is the main cause of the transmission of Original Sin, is that by which He established a solidarity between Adam and all of his descendants, so that Adam became our legitimate and true representative.

It matters little what kind of solidarity we hold or what form we give to the decree. The theories of a pact, of a juridical fiction, or even of a sort of physical presence in semine Adae, and many more have been advanced on this point. The fact will always remain that it is only because God so determined it that the solidarity of mankind in Adam was established. It may be said that this solidarity resembles, in a certain way, the one existing between Head and members in the Mystical Body.(21) This solidarity is what is meant by the expression "being included in Adam's will" or, as we said before, "being under Adam's moral headship."

The fact that this unity in Adam depends upon God's decree will become even more evident when we consider the opposite side of the picture: the hypothesis that Adam did not sin. In that case, he would have transmitted to us grace instead of Sin. Could we say, then, that the reason for our receiving grace at conception would have been only or mainly carnal descent from Adam? Certainly not. We can offer evidence for our case by mentioning that God's decision is the only possible answer to the question of why only the first sin of our first parent is so communicated to us, and not all his sins, nor all the sins of all our ancestors.

Bearing in mind what we have said above, let us now consider the different theories on the "debitum." The "caro-infecta" theory was actually the first under which a "debitum" was attributed to the Blessed Mother. It is based on the Augustinian notion of Original Sin and its mode of transmission. Prior to its animation by the soul, and therefore prior (at least with priority of nature) to the formation of the person, the newly conceived human body is already "infected" by the concupiscence of the generative act. The soul is contaminated by the infection of the body and from this Original Sin arises. Although for Cajetan this "debitum," consisting in the infection of the flesh, was the initium peccati originalis, some authors, like Del Prado, Marin Sola and Friethoff, have maintained it even after the definition of the Dogma of the Immaculate Conception.(22) They affirm that the infection of the flesh does not inply any stain of sin in the person, who comes into being only when the soul is united to the body. This theory, however, lays the whole emphasis in the process of transmission of Original Sin in carnal generation rather crudely conceived. God's part seems to be forgotten, or at most He can be said to have established a physical law that would necessarily cause its effect unless prevented by miraculous intervention. It almost forgets that Original Sin belongs to the Supernatural Order.

The theories of a "debitum proximum" result from a refinement of the "caro-infecta" theory, in the sense that transmission of Original Sin is no longer, as it were, a purely physical fact, but is the result of inclusion in Adam's will in the sense explained above. However, it is still insisted that carnal descent from Adam is per se the cause of Original Sin insofar as all those were included in his will who were to receive human nature from him. In other words, carnal generation is the necessary cause of inclusion in Adam's will.

Expanding what we have already stated, we say that it is only after and because God so decreed that carnal generation becomes a real cause of transmission of Sin. Therefore a proximate "debitum" in the sense of being included in Adam's will cannot result from carnal generation alone, but also, and principally, from God's will.

Previous to God's decree we must say that descent from Adam is only a "conditio sine qua non"--a requisite for "eligibility," so to speak--to be included in his will, to be put under his moral headship.

Herein lies the weakness of the theory of a "remote debitum." We simply cannot speak of a true necessity on the part of the individual to be included in Adam's will. God, if he chose, could have excepted any number of human beings from inclusion in that will. The defenders of this theory admit that He did this with Mary. Are we to say that by so doing He freed Mary from any necessity of being included?

We must conclude, then, that carnal descent from Adam by itself does not give origin to any true need to contract Original Sin. It is God's positive decree that establishes that need.

A remote "debitum" cannot exist because it would imply a need on God's part to include a determined individual in Adam's will. In this sense we agree with Fr. Sauras when he says that "a debitum either is personal (i.e., proximate), or it is a chimera."(23) We might speak of a "debitum" only if God had included Mary in Adam's will, and this to the extent that descent from Adam was the primary title to grace in her. Only then could we say that having lost that title to grace, Mary would have been in need of contracting Original Sin, insofar as God had determined that she be deprived of grace at her conception. This is impossible, because we know from Revelation that God

decided to endow Mary with the fullness of grace in the first instant of her conception, and we cannot affirm in God the existence of two contradictory decrees: the one determining Original Sin (i.e., lack of grace) to be in Mary's soul at her conception because of her descent from Adam, and the other determining fullness of grace (and therefore absence of sin) to be in her soul at her conception because of her role of Mother of the Incarnate Word. God's decrees are unchangeable and cannot contradict each other.(24)

Nor can a "proximate debitum" exist in Mary. Even if God had decided that Adam be also Mary's representative and that she be included in Adam's will, still this would not have been Mary's first and foremost title to grace. To prove this will be the scope of the next section.

II. MARY'S RELATION TO THE SECOND ADAM

Mary was decreed in one and the same decree, as the Incarnation of the Word was decreed.(25) She was first decreed to be the Mother of the Incarnate Word, and only then to be a daughter of Adam. And in the same single decree, it was decided that she was to receive, through the foreseen merits of her Son, fullness of grace from the beginning of her existence. Therefore, even if we want to affirm that God decided to include Mary in Adam's will, she would have acquired a new title to grace, which would have added to the grace she already was to have as Mother of Christ. Yet, the loss of this second title to grace would not have meant that Mary was bound to contract Original Sin. Her first and foremost title to grace would have still remained the same: her predestination to Divine Motherhood.

This is distinct from the question of the order of the divine decrees or, as otherwise known, of the primary reason for the Incarnation. It is commonly said and thought that to deny the "debitum" one must hold the Scotistic theory of the Absolute Predestination and Absolute Primacy of Christ. Granted that if this theory is accepted the denial of the "debitum" follows only naturally, and that it is in the context of this theory that the Immaculate Conception of Mary is best explained, it is nonetheless a fact that many who are not and do not wish to be Scotists still deny all "debitum" in Mary. In fact, it is enough to admit--as we must--that Mary was decreed in one and the same decree with Christ, to realize that she is closer to Christ than to Adam, and she forms a new and independent order of creation, together with, and in, Christ. Those who hold that the primary reason for Christ's coming was the Redemption of fallen mankind must logically admit that if Adam had not sinned, Christ would not have come. This they do admit, but since Mary was decreed in one and the same decree with Christ, they must also admit that if Adam had not sinned, Mary would not have existed.(25)

Nevertheless, Mary was truly redeemed by Christ. She owes to Him whatever graces and privileges she possesses. From this, too, it has been argued that Mary must have had a "debitum" of Original Sin, because otherwise she could not be said to have been redeemed. Redemption, according to these authors, means a liberation, a liberation which implies a certain negative terminus a quo. It is not sin in Mary's case; ergo, they conclude, it must be that certain necessity of contracting Original Sin which is called a "debitum."(27)

The ancestry of this argument militates against it. In former times it was used, in much the same form, to "prove" that Mary was conceived in Sin. When some immaculists conceded the Major and distinguished between Original Sin and the need to contract it, it was answered, and with good reason, that in such case Redemption would not be safeguarded.(28) Fr. Bonnefoy has shown with more than sufficient evidence that this way of reasoning is based on a false notion of Redemption arising in turn from an overstressing of the etymological meaning of the word.(29)

Actually, in order to apply the definition of Redemption given in our tracts De Redemptione to the Blessed Virgin, one needs a bit of ingenuity. For instance, it is said in the B.A.C. Summa that Redemption means a "liberation from some evil" and more specifically "a liberation, particularly from sin and the effects of sin."(30) Tanquerey defines Redemption as "the act whereby the fallen human race was freed from the bondage of sin and restored to the friendship of God."(31) If the "debitum" is not a stain, it does not safeguard Redemption--i.e., Redemption taken in this narrow, etymological sense, and if the "debitum" is a stain, in no way can it be attributed to Our Lady.

A reconsideration of the concept of Redemption seems to be needed, precisely to safeguard the truth of its universality, by making room for Mary to come under it without any loss of luster for her privileges.

That Mary's Redemption is different from ours is the oft-repeated and clear teaching of the last Pontiffs, who affirm that she was redeemed "in a more sublime manner"; "in a most perfect manner."(32)

The main difference is that Mary was redeemed lest she incur sin, whereas we are redeemed from the sin we contracted, either in conception, or through our own fault. Hers is a preservative Redemption.(33) But again, preservative Redemption can be given many different meanings. Some authors argue in favor of a "debitum" from this very fact of Mary's preservation by Christ. They insist that Mary must have been in the need of contracting Original Sin, because otherwise there would be nothing from which she could be preserved.

The decisive question is whether the fact that Mary was redeemed by way of preservation necessarily implies that she had a "debitum" of Original Sin.

Those who argue from preservation to a "debitum," consider preservation primarily as the act of driving away an impending evil. The important factor seems to be that sin is barred off, that it is not contracted. This would be the main effect of the merits of Christ when applied to Mary. Infusion of grace would follow as a consequence, or at most as a means to avoid the contracting of Original Sin.

If this is what preservation actually means, it would seem that there should be a "debitum" of Original Sin, although we would have the problem of determining just what it is, since we have seen already that neither a proximate nor a remote "debitum" can be attributed to Mary.

Fortunately, there is another way of understanding preservation. It is what we may call a positive view. Exemption from sin, in this view, is only an effect of

the infusion of sanctifying grace. The important thing is that all of Mary's graces come from Christ, and from Christ the Redeemer, to be sure. The primary effect of Christ's Redemption in Mary is to fill her soul with the fullness of grace. As a consequence it follows that, being full of grace, she could not be conceived in Original Sin (which is, let us recall, the privation of grace and naught else). This is what it means to say that Mary was preserved from Original Sin by virtue of the merits of Christ. We can see, then, why Redemption is possible even if Mary had no connection with Adam as with a moral head. The merits of Christ placed Mary beyond the reach of the Law of Sin.

Accordingly, the expression "had Mary not been preserved, she would have contracted Original Sin" means, first of all, that Mary is utterly dependent upon Christ for all her graces. Secondly, it also means that if God had not decreed Mary to be the Mother of Christ, He could have decreed Mary to be a simple daughter of Adam, and as such to be conceived without grace. We simply say "He could," because we can affirm no need or necessity without jeopardizing God's absolute freedom in His decrees.

It is in this sense that we are to understand those authors who, in defending the denial of the "debitum," maintain that all that is required to safeguard Mary's Redemption is the possibility of her being conceived in Original Sin. Redemption can be, and is, necessary, without Original Sin being necessary. The objection that in this case we should admit an equal possibility that Mary could have not contracted Original Sin even if not preserved,(34) is simply not valid. Mary had no title to grace of her own except Christ's merits.

Summing up, we can see how different is the notion of the Immaculate Conception that we gather from both sides of this controversy on the "debitum." For those who hold such a "debitum" in Our Lady, Immaculate Conception is like a last-minute intervention of God to prevent Mary from suffering the effects of a universal Law that bound her as strictly as anyone else. They affirm that in this way the Immaculate Conception is presented as a true miracle, and a far higher grace than it would be in the opposite hypothesis.(35) But it gives us a negative view of this Marian privilege. The Immaculate Conception is seen in the "light" of sin; it is principally the mystery of Mary's immunity from sin.

If we deny the "debitum" we see the Immaculate Conception as the mystery of Mary's fullness of grace at her conception, bestowed on her because of her predestination to the divine Motherhood. The Immaculate Conception is primarily "a theological truth that attributes to the Blessed Virgin Mary an altogether special order of grace."(36) Exemption from sin is but a consequence of the fullness of grace. The presence of grace, if we may be pardoned the oversimplification, simply makes its absence impossible.

Many other theological problems could be discussed in connection with the question of the alleged "debitum" of Original Sin in Mary: e.g., Mary's predestination to be a Co-Redemptrix with Christ, her position in regard to the Law of Death, her Assumption, etc. We cannot consider them all in this paper; yet we hope to have made clear that the question of the "debitum" is a fruitful enterprise, and helps to clarify other theological problems. Theology, in our day perhaps more than ever before, is tending decidedly towards unification. The study of any problem necessarily involves the study of many others, and the solution given to any one of them does bear upon the solution given to the others.

NOTES

(1) See Fr. Aldama, S.J., "Mariologia," Sacrae Theologiae Summa (Madrid: Editorial Catolica, 1956[3]), Vol. 3, p. 361, note 50, for a bibliography on the subject, complete up to 1955.

(2) De debito contrahendi peccatum originale in B. V. Maria (Virgo Immaculata, Vol. 11; Rome: Academia Mariana Internationalis, 1957).

(3) See ibid., appendix (pp. 456-99) for the minutes of the discussion taken from the tape recorded at the session. Cf. Jose Maria Delgado Varela, O.M., "Una célebre discusión acerca del débito del pecado original en la Virgen Santísima," Ephemerides Mariologicae, Vol. 5 (1955), pp. 191-209.

(4) Pope Pius IX, Bull Ineffabilis Deus, Dec. 8, 1854.

(5) De debito contrahendi ..., p. 499.

(6) See, e.g., Aldama, loc. cit., p. 360: "Debitum nihil est nisi necessitas quaedam, magis vel minus proxima, contrahendi peccatum originale." See also A. Carr and G. Williams, "Mary's Immaculate Conception," Mariology (ed. J. Carol, O.F.M.; Milwaukee: Bruce, 1955), Vol. 1, p. 381: "The debt of contracting original sin is an obligation, a necessity, an exigency of a human person's being subject to an initial privation of sanctifying grace."

(7) P. Hug, "The Modern Challenge against the Franciscan Tradition," De debito contrahendi ..., p. 411.

(8) See, e.g., X. Le Bachelet, "Immaculée-Conception," D.T.C., Vol. 7, cols. 1156ff: J. Pohle and A. Preuss, Mariology (Herder, 1945), pp. 39ff; A. Plessis, Manuale Mariologiae Dogmaticae (Pont-château, 1942), p. 57; J. Keuppens, Mariologiae Compendium (1947[2]), pp. 59ff.

(9) Pohle-Preuss, loc. cit., p. 40.

(10) G. Roschini, O.S.M., Compendium Mariologiae (Rome, 1946), p. 365. He quotes Cardinal Peter Colonna, O.F.M., who maintained that a portion of flesh was kept undefiled in Adam and the rest of the Patriarchs so that from it Mary's (and Jesus') body was formed.

(11) Delgado Varela, loc. cit., p. 194. He was Fr. Manuel Cuervo, O.P.; see also De debito contrahendi ..., p. 461.

(12) De debito contrahendi ..., p. 499.

(13) For the history of the controversy, see J.F. Bonnefoy, O.F.M., "La Negación del 'debitum peccati' en María," Verdad y Vida, Vol. 12 (1954), pp. 103-71; idem, "Sevilla por la Immaculada," Archivo Ibero-Americano, Vol. 15 (1955), pp. 1-27; P. Hug, loc. cit., pp. 388ff.

(14) Bonnefoy, "Marie indemne de toute tache du péché originel," De debito contrahendi ..., pp. 32-33 and passim.

(15) P. Hug, loc. cit., p. 391.

(16) A. Plessis, loc. cit., p. 57.

(17) See A. Wolter, "The Theology of the Immaculate Conception in the Light of the 'Ineffabilis Deus';"

Marian Studies, Vol. 5 (1954), pp. 19-70; on the "debitum," see pp. 62-70.

(18) O. Casado, "La Inmaculada Concepción y su problemática lapsaria en la Mariología española de 1600 a 1655," Ephemerides Mariologicae, Vol. 7 (1957), pp. 5-96.

(19) E. Mersch, The Theology of the Mystical Body (St. Louis: Herder, 1958), p. 163.

(20) J. A. de Aldama, loc. cit., p. 360.

(21) E. Mersch, op. cit., p. 164.

(22) J. F. Bonnefoy, "Quelques théories modernes du 'debitum peccati,'" Ephemerides Mariologicae, Vol. 4 (1954), pp. 269-331: idem: "Marie indemne de toute tache ...," pp. 3-23.

(23) Cited by Fr. Bonnefoy in "L'Immaculée dans le plan divin," Ephemerides Mariologicae, Vol. 8 (1958), p. 54.

(24) Ibid., pp. 48ff.

(25) Pope Pius IX, Bull "Ineffabilis Deus."

(26) A. Wolter, loc. cit.

(27) See Fr. Michael Browne's speech in the Roman discussion, in De debito contrahendi ..., Appendix, p. 478.

(28) P. Hug, loc. cit., p. 382.

(29) Bonnefoy, "L'Immaculée ...," p. 52ff; "Marie indemne ...," pp. 58-59.

(30. J. Solano, "De Verbo Incarnato," Sacrae Theologiae Summa (Madrid: Editorial Catolica, 1955^3), Vol. 3, p. 304.

(31)A. Tanquerey, Synopsis Theologiae Dogmaticae (Tournai: Desclée, 1952^{27}), Vol. 2, p. 729.

(32) Pope Pius IX, Bull "Ineffabilis Deus"; Pope Pius XII, "Fulgens Corona."

(33) P. Martinez, "La Redención preservativa de María," Ephemerides Mariologicae, Vol. 4 (1954), pp. 243-67.

(34) J. A. de Aladama, loc. cit., p. 359.

(35) Pohle-Preuss, loc. cit., p. 40.

(36) J. Alonso, "De recta methodo statuenda in quaestione de debito peccati in B.V.M.," De debito contrahendi ..., pp. 414-55, particularly p. 453.

REGARDING SCOTUS HIMSELF

JULIAN DAVIES, O.F.M.

A compilation of Scotus' texts on the Absolute Primacy of Christ -- Com. in Sent., III, d. 7, q. 3 -- can be found in Carl Balic's Theologiae Marianae Elementa (Sibenik in Yugoslavia: Theology Institute of Makarska; 1933). Scotus himself never used the expression "Absolute Primacy of Christ." What he speaks of is the predestination of Christ, its priority over all other predestinations, and its independence of original sin. His teaching on these points, however, is substantially that of his followers who, in our own day, discuss the Absolute Primacy of Christ.

Like most theologians of his day, Scotus treats of "The Predestination of Christ to be the Son of God." He begins by showing that, in the case of Christ, predestination does not concern a person, but a nature -- Christ's human nature -- since the Second Person of the Trinity cannot be said to be predestined. He then asks: "Does the predestination of Christ necessarily demand the fall of human nature, as many authorities seem to say when they assert the Son of God would never have become Incarnate if man had not sinned?" He words his negative reply in this way: "Recall my earlier lectures on predestination in which I asserted that predestination to glory, on the part of the object precedes, by the very nature of the case, the foreknowledge of the sin or damnation of anyone." Since the predestination of the human nature of Christ is a predestination to supreme glory, a fortiori it must precede the foresight of the sin or damnation of anyone. Christ, then, is predestined before original sin is foreseen, and His predestination does not demand the Fall.

Aside from the argument based on the nature of predestination, Scotus substantiates the fact that the Incarnation was decreed independently of original sin with another argument: "A person willing in an orderly fashion first wills what is closer to his ultimate purpose." But Christ is closest to God's ultimate purpose, viz., His glory; for Christ contributes to that glory pre-eminently. Therefore, Christ is the first willed of all created things.

Scotus presents further reasons for asserting the priority and independence of Christ's predestination. If the Incarnation were decreed only on account of original sin and would not have occurred apart from it, then we would have to admit that the Supreme work of God was occasioned and that Christ would rejoice over the fall of Adam. And these ideas are absurd. Furthermore, the glory in Christ's soul is greater than that in the soul of all the elect taken together. Would God will such great glory only for the glory of redeemed man?

Scotus resolves objections, stemming from Patristic testimony, which assert a dependence of the Incarnation upon the Fall. He states that Christ's coming as a suffering Redeemer is dependent upon the Fall, but His existence is not. Had Adam not sinned, Christ would have come, for He was first predestined. His Body, then, would have shared in His soul's glory from the beginning of their union. In the order of predestinations, Christ's Body was predestined to glory only after the souls of the elect were predestined to glory.

Reflecting upon these arguments, we see the simplicity of Scotus' position. The souls of all the elect are predestined to glory before any foresight of sin -- all the more so, Christ's soul. Christ is God's greatest work. God, who works in a most orderly way, cannot subordinate His Supreme Work to the lesser work of the Redemption. Certainly, Christ's sufferings were occasioned by, and ordered to, our salvation, but His existence is not. Ghrist exists primarily to glorify, ab extra, the Blessed Trinity.

Julian Davies, O.F.M.

SUFFICIENT REFLECTION FOR MORTAL SIN

JUDE MURPHY, O.F.M. and MARTIN KEELY, O.F.M.

Before a man be branded with mortal guilt, three criteria must be verified: an objective criterion, the material; and two subjective criteria, the volitional and the intellectual. Grave matter, full consent, and sufficient reflection must be present before this individual performing this action in these circumstances be considered gravely culpable. The proper understanding of these criteria has always been the moralist's responsibility. It is on this account that we have witnessed, in recent years, renewed investigation of sufficient reflection and full consent. Some re-evaluation and clarification has taken place in the light of data provided by recent psychological findings. On the face of it, one is tempted to wonder about this. Perhaps the moralists are slicing the human act too thin. It has become a complex, mystifying thing under their scrutiny. To verify everything they have discovered seems well nigh impossible. Common sense says, "I know or I don't"; "I will or I won't." Why complicate the procedure? The answer, of course, is that, whether we like it or not, the human act is a complicated procedure; it is complex and often mystifying by reason of its complexity. It is our purpose here to examine one facet of that unique act which is human -- sufficient reflection. We shall treat of it as adequately as time, space and our own information allow.

Terminology

Various authors use different expressions in explaining sufficient reflection. Occasionally, this results in some apparent contradictions. In order to obviate this difficulty, insofar as it can be obviated, a brief conspectus of some fundamental terminology may be helpful. A tendency exists to interchange and identify such terms as "sufficient reflection," "full deliberation," "perfect knowledge," "perfect deliberation," "full (sufficient or perfect) advertence," etc. Obviously the terms are not identical and when taken on face value seem to make for confusion. It must be noted, however, that no matter what term is employed, the various authors are merely trying to indicate the recognition of malice by the intellect. Each is attempting to draw attention to the same thing, no matter how apparently contradictory the terminology may be.

Here is a generalized schema designed to indicate in ascending order the perfection of various intellectual acts. Lowest on the scale is the act of knowing. Knowledge, Webster tells us, is "acquaintance with a fact; the act or state of understanding; clear perception of a truth; cognition." It is the genus into which we fit more specific intellectual acts. Least specific among such acts is the act of advertence. Again, according to Webster, advertence is "the act of adverting; turning the mind or giving attention." Higher on the scale is deliberation. It is the "weighing and examining of reasons for and against a choice or measure." Finally, we come to the most specific of intellectual acts, reflection. It is a "mental consideration; contemplation; also a conclusion reached after much thought." Besides including attention and the weighing of reasons pro and con, reflection also requires that knowledge be fully specified by a "conclusion reached after much thought."

Having included this brief mention of the semantics of the problem, we would add one further note before launching into the problem itself. It is this: no matter how specified the authors indicate the intellectual criterion should be, the act need not be reflex. It is not necessary that the one knowing or adverting or deliberating or reflecting be conscious of himself as knowing, adverting, deliberating or reflecting. He need not know that he knows, nor advert to his advertence, etc. With these things in mind, let us get on to the question at issue, viz., sufficient reflection.

Sufficient Reflection

When asked, "What is sufficient reflection?" one is reminded of Saint Augustine's quandary regarding the nature of time. Do not ask me and I know; ask me and I do not know. A random sampling of the manualists, however, will help us answer the question. Father Fanfani, O.P., would call sufficient reflection "full advertence."(1) Of it he says:

> For a truly mortal sin full advertence is always required, which advertence a man of sound mind ordinarily applies to affairs of great moment: for there is no greater affair than eternal salvation!

Although Father Fanfani italicises "full," we shall soon see that the authors generally do not require full or perfect knowledge in the strict sense, when they use the expressions. Fathers Ford and Kelly, of the Society of Jesus, clearly point this out when they state:(2)

> ... one might easily get the impression that for mortal sin it is necessary to have the most clear-cut intellectual apprehension of the alternatives involved and an almost unmixed adherence of the will to the evil act which is chosen.... But it quickly becomes apparent, when the act of deliberation or advertence is described in greater detail, that moralists have in mind a degree of knowledge and consent which is far from being one hundred percent perfect... theologians who speak of full or complete or perfect deliberation and consent are really demanding only sufficient deliberation and consent.

That would seem to solve many of our terminological difficulties with most of the manualists, but not with Father Fanfani. As we shall see later, he means "full" in a much stricter sense than most other authors.

The Jesuit Father Vermeersch prefers a negative description when he characterizes sufficient reflection as "actual advertence."(3)

> Actual advertence to the malice is demanded. It is not enough that a man could have and should have adverted. But one who consciously omits adverting to an obligation would still be guilty, in causa, of the evil effects which he would have foreseen at least in confuso.

Sabetti-Barrett merely state the proposition that for mortal sin "full advertence of the mind is required, otherwise full deliberation would not be had."(4)

Another description of sufficient reflection according to Genicot-Salsmans:(5)

> For mortal sin it is subjectively or formally required and sufficient: on the part of the intellect, full advertence to the grave malice of the act.... With regard to the advertence, direct attention to the grave malice of the act is sufficient...

In a paragraph entitled "Full Advertence," Henry Davis, S.J., writes:(6)

> Actual advertence by the intellect is a necessary condition for all mortal sins. It may be advertence to the act of sinning here and now, or advertence to a serious doubt as to the sinfulness of an act about to be done, or advertence to a state of culpable ignorance whilst acting, or advertence to the future natural effect of a voluntary sinful cause here and now set in motion...

Father Patrick O'Brien, C.M., gives an excellent description of sufficient reflection in a popular handbook written for the non-theologian. He states it clearly when he says:(7)

> To fulfill this condition for mortal sin, (Sufficient reflection) the advertence of the agent to the grave moral malice of his act must be subjectively full even though it is objectively confused.... This means, in simple terms, that the agent understands clearly that the suggested action contains serious moral evil.

We might conclude these descriptions by remarking that there is some vagueness about the moralists' treatment of sufficient reflection. However, this is not said in disparagement of their efforts, since the entire question of cognition and recognition belongs properly to the philosopher and psychologist. If we wish to learn more about sufficient reflection, we shall have to turn to psychology and philosophy rather than to moral theology. It would be foolish to demand of the Church a pat solution to all our questions in this realm. Her role is to encourage our investigation and to correct us when we obviously go astray. However, She cannot absolve us of the duty to use our reason in seeking solutions to such questions as that of sufficient reflection. Therefore, we will devote the remainder of the first section of this article to whatever else moral theology contributes to the question and in a second section (to appear in a later issue: Ed.) we will dwell more at length on the data which psychology offers for the solution of our difficulties regarding sufficient reflection.

Knowledge of Malice

Nearly all the authors mentioned in the foregoing paragraphs would certainly agree to one thing: it is not sufficient for grave sin that one simply know that this act is wrong. One must know how wrong (quantum malum) the act is. He need not know in what manner it is wrong (quomodo malum), but to incur grave guilt he must know that this act is gravely wrong. He must have knowledge of the malice of the act, whether it is seriously sinful or lightly sinful. Father Fanfani, O.P., gives clear expression to this when he says:(8)

> Neither is it sufficient for mortal sin that one clearly judge or at least suspect that a certain action is illicit; it is required that he clearly know that it is gravely illicit; for if it appears only in a confused and an obscure manner, it cannot be said that the sinner truly wished to turn himself from God.

Further on, he excuses from grave sin one "who knows indeed that his action is wrong, but does not know or does not advert to its gravity."(9)

Father Vermeersch, S.J., proceeds along these same lines. He tells us that "perfect comprehension of the substantial malice is necessary" if a person is to be said to have the reflection sufficient for grave sin.(10)

Father O'Brien, C.M., says much the same thing when he requires that the "agent understands clearly that the suggested action contains serious moral evil.... The agent does not, however, have to understand clearly the precise manner in which the suggested action contains serious moral malice."(11)

As has been said, the grave malice of an act must be known for it to be imputable as grave. One need not know why or how grave malice is present but he must know that it is present. Such knowledge is of the essence of sufficient reflection.

Frequently, however, we find authors who seem, consciously or not, to impute such knowledge to subjects who actually do not have it. This is accomplished by what has been called interpretative advertence. Authors who explicitly deny this sort of thing sometimes appear to hold it implicitly, under the guise of something called in confuso. We contend that the knowledge present in sufficient reflection is not the "knowledge" of interpretative advertence, nor can it ever be said to be truly in confuso.

Interpretative Knowledge

First we must consider interpretative knowledge. Fathers Ford and Kelly seem to think that it is passé.(12)

There is little danger nowadays that anyone will return to the outmoded doctrine of interpretative advertence, according to which a man is guilty of his objectively sinful conduct even if he did not actually advert to the malice of that conduct at all, provided he could have and should have adverted to it.

Father Vermeersch also advances the same view when he remarks that "it is not sufficient that a man could have and should have adverted."(13)

Father Davis seems to end the discussion when he observes:(14)

> A lamentable amount of confusion has been created by writers who speak of virtual advertence as sufficient to constitute mortal sin. In any true sense such a term is unintelligible, for when a person sins, he must actually know he sins. To quote one example only, Gonzales allows himself to say that "a man can sin mortally against the law, though at the very time of acting he does not know he is sinning, nay, even thinks it certain that he is doing right."

In Confuso Knowledge

Although the authors unanimously repudiate the notion of interpretative knowledge, a look into the frequently applied notion of in confuso knowledge suggests some stretching of the idea, so as to make it come dangerously near to interpretative advertence.

Father Fanfani unquestioningly accepts the in confuso notion. After excusing one who does not advert to the gravity of his act, even though he does know that it is in some way evil, he adds the following qualification:(15)

> ... excepting, however, if things evidently grave are treated, in which case it cannot be supposed that the one sinning does not attend advertently, at least in confuso (sic), to the gravity of the sin or to the obligation of investigating the matter better.

In other words, one must suppose that knowledge of the specific malice is present in the subject, since it could and should be present "if things evidently grave are treated." To say that one must know that some actions contain serious malice may legitimately be interpreted to say equivalently that one not only could but should know.

Father Vermeersch is likewise willing to accept in confuso advertence. He says:(16)

> Nor is distinct advertence to a certain definite malice demanded (for mortal sin); rather a consciousness in confuso of something gravely evil suffices. Nor must there be explicit attention to the offense against God, since philosophical sin does not exist.

A number of points emerge from this text. Either indistinct advertence is actual advertence, or it is not. If not, Father Vermeersch's requirement, "Actual advertence to the malice is demanded," has been contradicted.(17) At least this much is clear: in confuso advertence is not full. The very term implies a certain imperfection of knowledge. However, this is not to say that full knowledge is necessary for grave sin.

Father Vermeersch also mentions "philosophical sin." A possible implication in this context (certainly not intended by the author) may be that any denial of the validity of the concept of in confuso advertence to the malice of an act leads to the error condemned by Pope Alexander VIII. However, a reading of the proscribed thesis makes it apparent that the implication is unwarranted. The Pope condemned anyone who held:(18)

> Philosophical or moral sin is a human act unbefitting rational nature and right reason; theological or mortal sin is a free transgression of the divine law; philosophical sin, although grave, in one who is ignorant of God or who does not think of God in performing the action, is a grave sin but is not an offense against God, nor is it a mortal sin dissolving the friendship of God, nor is it worthy of eternal punishment.

Father Davis takes exception to the entire notion of in confuso advertence. Again he laments:(19)

> No less lamentable confusion has been caused by writers speaking of confused advertence being sufficient for mortal sin. What should be stated is that if a person acts with a doubtful conscience in a concrete case, deliberately taking the risk of a grievous offense against God, he is said to have a confused idea of the wrongfulness of the action. As a fact, he has not a confused idea; he knows perfectly well that it is a grievous sin deliberately to risk offending God grievously. Of that he has the clearest possible idea. We should, therefore, in order to avoid confusion, dismiss these misleading terms and say that for mortal sin advertence must be full, actual and distinct.

Perhaps Father Davis and the other authors are talking about two entirely different things when they refer to in confuso knowledge. His point, however, is worth making. In confuso knowledge does not refer to any subjective confusion; there is no hazy or foggy idea in the subject. Rather, it refers to confusion concerning the object. The subject is perfectly conscious. His conscience must truly judge that serious sin is present in this action, not by reason of the action itself (since this is doubtful), but by reason of actual or habitual advertence to the serious malice of performing an act which one suspects or doubts to be seriously sinful. In confuso knowledge is a valid concept only in this sense.

Degrees of Knowledge

Granting that all the authors mean sufficient knowledge, regardless of what other names they give it (full knowledge, perfect deliberation, actual advertence, etc.), we now examine the question of degrees of knowledge.

"Sufficient" is a relative term. It implies degrees of knowledge and hence, degrees of imputability. This fundamental supposition underlies our entire discus-

sion. Our question here is this: given grave matter and full consent of the will, what is the minimum degree of knowledge necessary for grave culpability? At what point does knowledge become sufficient to make an act imputable? At what point does it make an act gravely imputable? Certainly, perfect or full knowledge is not required. But some knowledge is required. How much? A lot? A little? Only God knows the exact answer. But we must try as best we can to approximate.

Before trying to answer the question "How much?" it will be well to clear up one possible difficulty. The idea of degrees in knowledge is somewhat problematic. One either knows or he does not know. How, then, can we speak of degrees? The explanation is to be found in the fact that knowledge, like freedom, is of two sorts. Just as we speak of freedom as an absolute in philosophy (libertas indifferentiae) and a relative freedom in psychology, so do we make the distinction between absolute knowledge which is conceptual and relative knowledge which is evaluative. One either knows that two plus two equals four, or he does not know. There is no middle ground. We call this conceptual knowledge. On the other hand, one may evaluate more perfectly or less perfectly the relationship between his present action and his immediate circumstances, and his present action and its relation to his final end. This sort of knowledge varies in degree. We call it evaluative. Thus it is in the sphere of evaluative knowledge that we can speak of sufficiency in the act of reflection.

How Much is Sufficient?

How much is sufficient? Father Fanfani puts the price high. He has already been quoted as saying that, for grave sin, "full advertence is always required, which advertence a man of sound mind ordinarily applies to affairs of great moment."(20) Later he tells us that by "matters of great moment" he means such things as "buying a house, selling a farm, etc."(21) Certainly these are not spur-of-the-moment actions. A great deal of reflection should go into such decisions. Does grave sin require this much reflection?

Fathers Ford and Kelly seem to say yes. They remark that the concept of morality is meaningful only when applied to acts which are deliberate, that is those done with knowledge and consent. They then go on to lay particular stress on such actions as administering a sacrament, sentencing a criminal, giving judgment in a lawsuit, binding oneself to a contract.(22)

Again the price is high. Decisions like those cited should not be made offhand. Truly they are important, and more than a little reflection should be present in making them.

Vermeersch's requirement: that the act of advertence be made with an efficacy proportionate to the act of evaluating one's last end in accordance with its worth, also lends weight to the foregoing opinion.

By the very fact that they require a relatively large degree of reflection, moralists implicitly demand that both kinds of knowledge, conceptual and evaluative, be present in the act of sufficient reflection. If conceptual knowledge alone were required, there would be no sense in mentioning degrees of reflection, since this is proper only to evaluative knowledge. As Fathers Hagmaier and Gleason have written:

> Modern moralists are willing to admit that even granted correct and sufficient conceptual knowledge of the evil of the act to be committed, man may still not have the required "sufficient reflection" for grave sin. With the use of reason unimpaired, man can still fail to be free in his choice. The reason for this is that today moralists admit that there is such a thing as "evaluative cognition" required for grave sin.(23)

Where To Now?

Up to this point we have been considering sufficient reflection in general. We have seen that it is necessary for grave sin. We have briefly investigated its essential note, knowledge of malice. The insufficiency of interpretative knowledge and in confuso knowledge was also pointed out. Finally, degrees of knowledge occupied our attention. A natural conclusion from the notion of degrees was seen to be evaluative knowledge. In a second section of this article we shall deal more specifically with this type of knowledge. We shall employ the data of psychology to help answer the questions which arise concerning this essential part of the act of sufficient reflection.

NOTES

(1) P. Ludovicus Fanfani, O.P., Manuale Theorico-Practicum Theologiae Moralis ad Mentem D. Thomae (Rome: Libraria "Ferrari," 1949), I, n. 318 b).

(2) John C. Ford, S.J. and Gerald Kelly, S.J., Contemporary Moral Theology (Westminister, Maryland: The Newman Press, 1958), p. 206.

(3) Arthur Vermeersch, S.J., Theologiae Moralis: principia- responsa-consilia (Rome: Gregorian University, 1926), I, n. 416.

(4) Sabetti-Barrett, Compendium Theologiae Moralis (New York: Frederick Pustet Co., Inc., 1931), n. 128.

(5) Genicot-Salsman, Institutiones theologiae moralis (17th ed.), I, n. 154.

(6) H. Davis, S.J., Moral and Pastoral Theology (New York: Sheed and Ward, Inc., 1935), I, p. 216.

(7) Patrick O'Brien, C.M., Emotions and Morals (New York: Grune and Stratton, 1950), p. 88.

(8) Fanfani, op. cit., I, n. 318 b).

(9) Ibid.

(10) Vermeersch, op. cit. (1947 ed.), I, n. 49.

(11) O'Brien, op. cit., p. 88.

(12) Ford and Kelly, op. cit., I, p. 201.

(13) Vermeersch, op. cit. (1926 ed.), I, n. 416.

(14) Davis, op. cit., I, p. 216.

(15) Fanfani, op. cit., I, n. 318 b).

(16) Vermeersch, op. cit. (1947 ed.), I, n. 49.

(17) Vermeersch, op. cit. (1926 ed.), I, n. 416.

(18) Augustino Lehmkuhl, S.J., Casus Conscientiae (Friburg: B. Herder Co., 1913), I, n. 136, citing a proposition proscribed by Alexander VIII on August 24, 1690.

(19) Davis, op. cit., I, p. 216.

(20) Fanfani, op. cit., I, n. 318 c).

(21) Ibid.

(22) Ford and Kelly, op. cit., I, p. 205.

(23) George Hagmaier, C.S.P. and Robert Gleason, S.J., Counselling the Catholic (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1959), p. 217.

CASE IN POINT

PAUL LILLIS, O.F.M.

Q. John Scott, an infant son of non-Catholic parents, was baptized in articulo mortis by a Catholic priest. Miraculously, the child lived. What are the juridic effects after he reaches the age of reason?

A. There is but one Baptism, theologically speaking. However, juridic effects differ according to whether a person is a baptized non-Catholic; a baptized Catholic raised as a non-Catholic from infancy; or a baptized Catholic raised in Catholicism. We must determine the exact status of John Scott.

Was John's emergency baptism valid? The very first circumstance that could affect its validity is a previous baptism.(1) If John had been validly baptized by a non-Catholic minister, then the emergency baptism would be invalid and therefore ineffective. The second circumstance to be investigated concerns whether or not John had attained the use of reason.(2) According to the law (canon 88) a child who is under the age of seven years (called infans) is not considered responsible for his actions. However cases do occur in which a child attains the use of reason before the age of seven years. For the sake of solving this hypothetical case, we will proceed on the presumption that John had never been previously baptized and that he had not yet attained the use of reason. At the moment of the emergency baptism, John was an unbaptized infant.

"An infant of unbaptized parents can be lawfully baptized, even despite the objections of the parents, if the danger of death of the infant is such that it may be prudently judged the child will die before it comes to the use of reason." (canon 750). Pope Benedict XIV, in his Constitution "Postremo Mense," February 28, 1747, states that such an infant may be baptized, and shows that this had been decided previously by the Sacred Congregation of the Holy Office. It is evident that, when the infant is in danger of death, his right to baptism which he gets through the Redemption of Christ is superior to the right of the parents over the child, for he is then in extreme spiritual need to which all inferior rights must give way.(4)

Is John baptized in the Catholic Church? In this case, John was unable to make the request for baptism and his parents' rights were relinquished. The intention of the minister of the sacrament is the determining element.(5) The priest intended to do what the Church does, so John is validly baptized in the Catholic Church. "By baptism a person becomes a subject of the Church of Christ with all the rights and duties of a Christian, unless, in so far as rights are concerned, there is some obstacle impeding the bond of communion with the Church, or a censure inflicted by the Church" (canon 87). The logical conclusion is that all baptized persons are fundamentally subject to the Church.

However, a distinction is introduced here. In general, Catholics educated in Catholicism, provided they have attained the use of reason and are at least seven years old, are subject to all ecclesiastical laws (canon 12). But what about baptized non-Catholics and baptized Catholics raised as non-Catholics?

Catholic writers are agreed that juridically all heretics are fundamentally subjected to the laws of the Church,(6) although not faithful members of that organization. Some authors claim that heretics are bound to laws directed for the common good but exempted from those laws enacted for personal sanctification.(7) An example is deduced from canon 732 #2: "It is forbidden to administer the Sacraments of the Church to heretics or schismatics, even though they err in good faith and ask for them, unless they have first renounced their errors and have been reconciled with the Church." Because of this prohibition, these authors conclude that heretics are not directly and actually bound by the laws of annual Confession (c. 906) and of Paschal Communion (c. 859). From a strictly juridical standpoint, this opinion lacks a canonical foundation. However, because of the authorities behind it, it is considered as probable and may be followed in practice.(8) Even here, "No ignorance of invalidating or inhabilitating laws excuses from their observance, unless the laws explicitly admit ignorance as an excuse" (c. 16).

As a practical conclusion, we find two areas in which John, being uninstructed in Catholicism, is absolutely bound. First, he is held to the impediment of disparity of cult. "Marriage between a person baptized in the Catholic Church, or received into the Church from heresy or schism, and an unbaptized person is null and void" (c. 1070 #1). The Committee for the Authentic Interpretation of the Code declared on April 29, 1940,(9) that persons born of non-Catholics and baptized in the Catholic Church, but not raised as Catholics, are bound to the impediment of disparity of cult according to canon 1070 when they marry unbaptized persons.

Secondly, he is held to the canonical form of marriage. The following persons are bound to observe the canonical (c. 1094) form of marriage: "(1) All persons baptized in the Catholic Church, and converts from heresy or schism (even though they afterwards lapsed from the Church), whenever they contract marriage among themselves; (2) these same persons are bound to observe the canonical form of marriage also when they contract marriage with non-Catholics, either baptized or unbaptized, even after they have obtained a dispensation from the impediment of mixed marriage or of disparity of cult; (3) Catholics of Oriental Rites, if they contract marriage with persons bound to observe this canonical form of marriage" (canon 1099 #1).

The Code formerly exempted from the canonical form of marriage, persons born of non-Catholics and baptized in the Catholic Church but reared outside the faith from infancy whenever they

married non-Catholics (cf. former wording of canon 1099 #2). But by Motu Proprio of August 1, 1948,(10) Pope Pius XII restored the legislation of the "Ne Temere" decree, and ruled that beginning with January 1, 1949, all persons baptized in the Catholic Church, regardless of the religion of their parents and regardless whether they have been reared from infancy outside the Catholic faith, are bound, even when they marry non-Catholics, to observe under pain of invalidity the Catholic canonical form of marriage. To this end, he abrogated and ordered to be expunged from the Code the second clause of canon 1099 #2. Beginning with January 1, 1949, therefore, marriages of such persons even with non-Catholics will be invalid unless the canonical form of marriage is observed.

NOTES

(1) C.732 "The Sacrament of Baptism . . . cannot be received a second time." Hence, if John had been validly baptized once, a second attempted baptism would be invalid and therefore ineffective.

(2) If John had attained the use of reason, he would be considered an adult by law and c. 752 states that an adult shall not be baptized except with his own knowledge and consent manifested in some way.

(3) Benedict XIV, "Postremo Mense," Feb. 28, 1747, reprinted in Gaspari's Fontes Codicis Juris Cononicis, II, p. 62ff.

(4) Genicot-Salsmans, Institutiones Theologiae Moralis, I, 167, A.

(5) Most. Rev. Adolph Marx, DD. JCD, "The Question of Those Baptized 'In Ecclesia Catholica,'" Jurist, XVIII, #4, Oct. 1958, p. 455, #3 and #e.

(6) A. VanHove, Commentarium Lovaniense in Codicem Juris Canonici, Vol. I, Tome II, "De Legibus Ecclesiasticis" (Mechliniae-Romae: H. Dessain; 1930), p. 201.

(7) F. Santi, Praelectiones Juris Canonici, (Ratisbonae, 1898), I, 22, n. 31; F. Cavagnis, Institutiones Juris Publici Ecclesiastici, (Rome: 1906), I. p. 360, n. 564.

(8) J. A. McCloskey, The Subject of Ecclesiastical Law according to Canon 12, (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Canon Law Study No. 165; 1943); p. 147 also refers to Claeys-Bouuaert et Simenon (Manuale Juris Canonici, I, p. 91, n. 160) who think it is communior.

(9) Acta Apostolicae Sedis, XXXII, p. 212.

(10) Acta Apostolicae Sedis, XL, August 16, 1948, pp. 305-306.

ST. THOMAS AQUINAS AND THE PRIMACY OF CHRIST

MICHAEL MEILACH, O.F.M.

> He is the true likeness of the God we cannot see; His is that first birth which precedes every act of creation. Yes, in Him all created things took their being, heavenly and earthly, visible and invisible; what are thrones and dominions, what are princedoms and powers? They were all created through Him and in Him; He takes precedency of all, and in Him all subsist.(1)

With these words St. Paul gives us to understand that Jesus Christ, the Incarnate Word, holds a special place above all creatures, a position which the same Apostle goes on to call the "primacy."(2)

Surely there is no difficulty in seeing how Christ as God enjoys this precedency and primacy over creatures, but it is perhaps less obvious whether or not the human nature of Christ likewise possesses (in virtue of its union with the divinity) a precedency and primacy within the created order.

Franciscan theologians in general, perhaps because of the devotion of St. Francis to the humanity of Christ, have tended to affirm this primacy of Christ's human nature. They have made it the foundation not only of their spirituality, but of their entire theology.

Yet, if we understand the message of St. Paul correctly, this "Christocentrism" cannot be something exclusively Franciscan. One could cite practically every page of each of his Epistles as an exhortation to put Christ in the center of our lives--to let Christ be all in all.

This article, however, is not concerned with asceticism; it is concerned with dogmatic theology, the rock-like foundation for asceticism. If we can establish by theologically acceptable proofs that Christ, precisely in His human nature, enjoys an absolute and universal primacy over all other creatures, then we shall have established an important fact: that He must occupy the central place in theology and in every phase of human existence.

These remote conclusions will come later, however. In the first part of the article, we shall try to show as clearly as possible what is meant by the primacy of Christ, and in the second part, we shall show how this primacy is implied in the thought of St. Thomas.

I. Clarification of the Concept of the Primacy

As a clearly-defined teaching, the primacy of Christ is a rather recent development in Catholic theology. To give a clear explanation of what it denotes, we shall trace the major steps in its evolution from the time of St. Thomas until our own.

A. Would God Have Become Man If Adam Had Not Sinned?

St. Thomas himself never treated the question of Christ's primacy in the actual created order. The closest he came to giving it an ex professo treatment

was a three-fold discussion of this hypothetical question of whether the Incarnation would have taken place without original sin.

In his Commentary on the Sentences, St. Thomas notes that only He can answer this question "Who was born and offered because He willed it."(3) Nevertheless, St. Thomas goes on to explain that some authorities "have expressed the probable opinion that if man had not sinned, the Son of God would not have become man." He avoids drawing a definitive conclusion, however:

> Others, however, say that since not only redemption from sin, but also the exaltation of human nature and the consummation of the entire universe was accomplished by the Incarnation, therefore even if there had been no sin, He would have become Incarnate for these reasons, and this opinion can also be called probable.

The same reluctance to give an apodictic answer marks the Saint's commentary on the First Epistle to Timothy:

> This is not a very important question, because God ordained things to be accomplished as they have been accomplished. And we do not know what He would have ordained if He had not foreseen sin. Nevertheless, authoritative writers seem to state expressly that He would not have become incarnate if man had not sinned; I am inclined to accept this view.(4)

The Summa Theologica contains the latest, and hence definitive, treatment of this question; here, the Angelic Doctor concludes:

> ... seemingly our assent ought rather to be given to this (negative) opinion. For such things as spring from God's will and beyond the creature's due, can be made known to us only through being revealed in the Sacred Scripture.... Hence since everywhere in the Sacred Scripture the sin of the first man is assigned as the reason of the Incarnation, it is more in accordance with this to say that the work of the Incarnation was ordained by God as a remedy for sin; so that, had sin not existed, the Incarnation would not have been.(5)

If this answer, being St. Thomas' last word on the question, differed greatly from the earlier treatments we have cited, we should have to discount them. But since it reveals the same cautious attitude and the same type of reasoning (i.e., St. Thomas found that Scripture gives only the Redemption as a reason for the Incarnation), we may conclude that the Summa agrees substantially with the earlier works and that he still considered the question "not very important."

Therefore, although Fr. C. Urrutibehety, O.F.M., may have exaggerated in writing that St. Thomas held the negative opinion only out of respect for authority,(6) we consider this view to be substantially correct. Certainly, if one considers Christ only as Redeemer, it makes eminent sense to say that without sin there would be no need for Christ (qua Redeemer). Only if one adopts the totally different point of view of the ontological excellence of Christ will the opposite answer suggest itself. St. Thomas does not seem to have considered the matter from this point of view.

B. What Is the Final "Motive" of the Incarnation?

We have seen that St. Thomas gave a negative, if hesitant, answer to the hypothetical question of whether an Incarnation might have taken place in a different world-order in which there was no sin. But whatever answer he gave to this question, he was well aware that it was a hypothetical one and therefore "not very important." Would he have felt the same about a non-hypothetical question regarding the place of Christ in God's actual design for this universe? It is difficult to say, because neither he nor any other scholastic before the 14th Century seems to have treated this non-hypothetical question. Duns Scotus seems to have been the first to transfer the matter to the real, actual world-order. For when the Subtle Doctor explained that so great a good as the Incarnation could not be occasioned,(7) he referred not to a hypothetical Incarnation, but to the one which actually took place in Nazareth. For this reason, it is not entirely correct to say that Scotus "opposed" St. Thomas; the two were treating entirely different questions.

After the time of Scotus, at any rate, interest began to center around the non-hypothetical question, which may be expressed thus: "What was the principal reason why God became man?" Certainly, God's ultimate reason would have to be His own glory, but the question looked rather to the principal proximate reason, which might be either the Redemption or Christ's own glory.

In recent years, Fr. J. F. Bonnefoy, O.F.M., has shed still more light upon this question by calling attention to the term "motive" which some theologians use instead of "reason" when speaking of God's reason for the Incarnation.(8) God, Fr. Bonnefoy insisted, could not possibly be "motivated" in the strict sense, because that would demand that something exterior to God have an active influence on Him, a situation which is metaphysically impossible. The same is true of "conditions" and "occasions," as Fr. Bonnefoy continued to emphasize in later articles.(9)

Peter Lombard had pointed out this same fact in the early Scholastic Age, however: "God's will has no cause, and hence we should not look for one."(10) And so Fr. D. J. Unger, O.F.M.Cap., seems justified when he says that "though we agree that it is better not to use the term 'motive,' inasmuch as it is less accurate technically, it is not such a dangerous word, as if it made the correct positing of the problem impossible."(11)

C. Does God Will One Thing Before Another?

In the preceding section we saw that the problem after the 14th Century was this: Was the principal proximate reason for the Incarnation the Redemption, or was it Christ's own glory? L. Molina, who lived in the 16th Century, noted that no progress was being made in reconciling these opinions (Thomist and Scotist, respectively), and so he made a novel attempt to settle the matter. To understand his solution,

though, we must first consider the device known as "instances of reason" (signa rationis).

Instances of reason may be defined as successive stages inserted by human reason into the single, unique divine act, which is, strictly speaking, God Himself. As every Catholic theologian knows, God is Pure Act; He is incapable of experiencing change, and so His Act is unique, simple, and eternal. But God alone can grasp Himself in one, unique Word; our knowledge of Him is merely analogous, and we must, if we are to understand Him at all, anthropomorphize Him to some extent, as we do, for instance, when we ask Him to "let Thy ears be attentive to the voice that calls on Thee for pardon."(12) We do the same thing when we conceive of God as "setting up a plan" in successive stages. We say that God "first" willed Adam, "then" foresaw original sin, and "finally" devreed the Redemption, but we do not really mean that God proceeded from one stage to the next as we do in solving an algebra problem. What we do mean is to express either a real or a logical relationship between two or more created beings.

First, we use instances of reason to express a real relationship. If we analyze the order so apparent in nature, we find that creatures are related in various ways. As St. Thomas put it, "The parts of the universe are ordered to each other, according as one acts upon the other, and according as one is the end and exemplar of the other."(13) Now, when we arrange these different creatures in what may be called the "divine plan of creation," we say that the less worthy ones were willed by God "after" the more worthy, the effects "after" the causes, the means "after" the end, and the copies "after" the model.

The second purpose for using instances of reason, we said, is to express a merely logical relationship. As St. Thomas said, "It is necessary that the type of the order of things towards their end should pre-exist in the divine mind."(14) In God, of course, nothing has to "pre-exist"; yet we cannot conceive of an intelligent being performing an act of the will without somehow knowing "first" what he is going to will, and so we transfer this "logical priority" to God.

When we use instances of reason, then, we do not mean that God willed the various beings separately and without any mutual connection. On the contrary, He wills them all as integral parts of one single, harmonious "plan"; but since one is more fundamental, more important, than another, we arrange them in a temporal sequence. We could have arranged them in a spatial sequence and said that the most important creature was "topmost," rather than "first," but experience has shown that these spatial figures are more unwieldy than the temporal ones, and so it is conventional to use the analogies of time.(15)

Now we are in a position to understand what Molina tried to do. Blaming these instances of reason for the difference of opinion between Scotists ("Christ was willed 'first'") and Thomists ("Men were willed 'first'"), he sought to reconcile these contradictory opinions by suppressing the instances of reason: "It is clear that the moments of Scotus and of others must be suppressed, in which God, when He decreed the Incarnation and predestined Christ and the other elect while rejecting other men would have willed one thing before another."(16)

Fr. G. M. Roschini, O.S.M., has proposed the same solution:

> It was really at the same time, then, that God willed Christ, His Mother, and the permission for sin; but He did not will the permission for sin before Christ (as the Thomists would have it) or Christ before the permission for sin (as the Scotists claim).(17)

Like Molina, however, Fr. Roschini seems to have avoided the question. What we want to know is not whether God works in stages (all agree He does not), but which effect was more basic, more important, in His unique decree of creation. This question cannot be answered simply by insisting on the eternal nature of the divine act.

We may conclude then, that although it has not actually solved the problem of Christ's place in the divine plan, Molinism has clarified that problem by helping us to see the true nature and purpose of instances of reason.

D. Is the Incarnation Independent of the Redemption?

Fr. J. Solano, S.J., in one of the most modern and thorough manuals of theology available, clarifies our question still further by asking whether the Incarnation is independent, in this actual world order, of original sin.(18) He concludes, after citing a number of Scriptural texts, that "no text speaks of any motive for the Incarnation independent of the Redemption."(19)

A distinction would seem called for here. Certainly God had no motive for the Incarnation such that the Incarnation would take place independently of the Redemption; but God may have other reasons for the Incarnation which, taken in themselves, involve no necessary connection with the Redemption. Our Lord Himself said: 'What I was born for, what I came into the world for, is to bear witness to the truth."(20)

Nevertheless, Fr. Solano's point is an important one for us to note; it means that the "plan of creation" which we attribute to God must make provision for a Redemptive Incarnation. Since Jesus Christ came as our Redeemer, suffered and died for us, we cannot speak of an "impassible Christ" or a "glorious Incarnation." The Incarnation as it took place is intimately connected with the Redemption, and wherever we locate Christ in the divine plan, we must take care to make that fact plain.

E. The Primacy of Christ Precisely Defined

From the foregoing historical sketch, we may draw the following conclusions:

1. The hypothetical question explicitly considered by St. Thomas is not relevant to the question of Christ's Primacy, which concerns the real, actual order.

2. The place assigned to Christ in the divine plan is based not on temporal considerations, but on causal ones.

3. The degree of priority of Christ in the Divine plan depends upon the universality and perfection of the causal influence He exerts upon other creatures.

4. In explaining how Christ was "first willed" we must not attempt to make the decree of the Incarnation "independent" of that of the Redemption.

The primacy of Christ to which we refer, then, denotes His universal extrinsic causality with respect to every other creature. The word "extrinsic" eliminates formal and material causality, which He cannot exercise over anything without "becoming" that thing. Three kinds of causality remain, then: final, exemplary, and efficient (or meritorious). In the measure in which He exercises unlimited causal influence over everything else, Christ may be said to enjoy an absolute and universal primacy over the rest of creation.

II. A Solution Based Upon the Principles of St. Thomas

It should be stressed at the outset that we are not trying to show that St. Thomas ever explicitly taught this threefold universal extrinsic causality of Christ. Nor, strictly speaking, are we saying that he "would have" held it; only God knows what a free creature "would have" done. What we shall try to show is that St. Thomas definitely taught principles which, if applied to the question of Christ's primacy, logically lead to the same teaching as that propounded by Duns Scotus: that Christ, even in His human nature, holds the absolute and universal primacy over all creation. These principles are as follows:

A. The Final Causality of Christ

In creating, God "intends only to communicate His perfection, which is His goodness."(21) Therefore, He created out of sheer goodness, to share His glory with creatures and to receive from them formal, extrinsic, objective glory.

'Since God's love is the cause of goodness in things . . . no one thing would be better than another, if God did not will greater good for one than for another."(22) Therefore, since God destined the human nature of Christ for the most perfect good (i.e., substantial union with the Godhead), Christ's human nature must be the most perfect created nature, or "thing."

"In the order of effects, the better a thing is, so much the more is it prior in the intention of the agent."(23) Therefore, since Christ's human nature is the most perfect created effect, as we just saw, it must have been willed "first" by God.

"In the parts of the universe . . . the less noble (creature) exists for the nobler."(24) And so Christ must be the final cause of every other creature. "But nothing is directed towards an end unless the will for that end already exists,"(25) and so for this reason too, Christ's human nature must have been willed prior to all other creatures.

B. The Exemplary Causality of Christ

"Whatever is most perfect is always the exemplar, which the less perfect copies according to its mode."(26) But Christ's human nature is the most perfect of all creatures. Even empirically, we can see that it contains in a perfect way every degree of created being. Therefore, it must be the universal, secondary exemplary cause of all creation (The uncreated Word is the primary one).

C. The Efficient Causality of Christ

"Whatever comes first in any order is the cause of all that come after it."(27) St. Bonaventure says the same thing: "The greater a being's priority, the more productive a source is it for other beings."(28) And so Christ must be the secondary efficient cause of all creation, per modum meriti.

* * * *

The cogency of these principles is such that more and more theologians(29) are coming to acknowledge Christ's absolute primacy, which includes His threefold universal causality with respect to the rest of creation; and they are doing so in full conformity with the true mind of St. Thomas as shown not in the "unimportant" hypothetical question, but in these basic metaphysical principles which he so often used.

Before drawing any practical conclusions, let us examine three possible objections to the solution we have just presented.

First, it would seem that Christ's human nature, being partly material, is inferior to that of the angels, which is pure spirit. We believe, however, that there are two difficulties in this position. The first of these is that the criterion of spirituality seems to be an arbitrary one on which to judge dignity. May we not judge it instead on proximity to God? For, as Fr. C. V. Heris, O.P., wrote, "The elevation of Christ by the Hypostatic Union, to the highest pinnacle of creation, evidently procures for His Humanity an unparalleled glory. Not only does it confer on Him a primacy of pre-eminence over all creatures, but even a primacy of finality."(30)

The second difficulty inherent in this first objection is that the objection itself seems to be founded on a faulty presupposition: that the human nature of Christ can be evaluated absolutely, i.e., independently of the Person of the Word. It can be considered absolutely, of course, since it did not have to exist at all, and the Word would still be the Word. But it cannot be evaluated thus, because it derives its dignity and value from that very union with the Word. To assign it an absolute value apart from the Divine Person, we should have to hypostatize it, which we cannot do. Rather we must evaluate it in the concrete, united as it is most intimately to the Word. If we do so, we find that the human nature of Christ excells all other creatures in nature, in grace, and in glory, to a degree which we can call, for all practical purposes, infinite.(31)

Second, it would seem that Christ cannot come first in the divine plan because of Fr. Solano's important observation on the redemptive nature of the Incarnation. For if Christ was willed logically prior to the permission for Adam's sin, He should have come as a glorious King, not as a Redeemer. But Christ did come as a Redeemer, and so Adam's sin must have been permitted before the Incarnation was decreed.

At first, this objection seems insurmountable; however, we must remember that instances of reason express causal relationships rather than temporal

ones. To say that original sin was permitted before Christ was willed is equivalently to say that Christ was willed primarily to redeem us from that sin; to say that Christ was willed before original sin was permitted, on the other hand, is equivalently to say that original sin was permitted for the sake of Christ.

Now, since St. Thomas' principles lead inevitably to the latter conclusion, we must explain how original sin might possibly be permitted for the sake of Christ. Unfortunately, space does not permit us to attempt such an explanation here, but the reader is referred to a good one by Fr. Bonnefoy.(32) In any case, it should be remembered that no adequate explanation of original sin is given by any theological system; the point here is to comply with St. Thomas' metaphysical principles, not to seek a completely understandable explanation of the mystery of sin.

Third, the Council of Nicaea explicitly states that Christ was willed for our salvation: "Who for us men and for our salvation came down from heaven and was made flesh." As St. Thomas explains, however,

> A thing can exist for another in two ways. In one sense, it is ordered to the other as to its proper and principal end, in which case it is repugnant to say that one thing exists for another less noble...since the end is superior to those things which are ordered to it. In the second sense, something is said to exist for another, meaning that it is useful for it. In this way the king exists for the peasant, since the king's government procures peace for the peasant.(33)

As the king exists for the peasant, so Christ exists for us; but who would claim that the king exists primarily for the peasant? Should we not rather conclude, with Fr. Garrigou-Lagrange, O.P., that God permitted Adam's sin for the sake of Christ?(34)

If we follow St. Thomas and take care to distinguish the "proper and principal end" from the "useful end," we see immediately that the Nicene Creed is speaking for the latter only, whereas we are concerned with the former.

Conclusion

St. Thomas' principles show clearly that even in His human nature, Christ is the "summit of the holy mountain towards which the beings of all time and place converge,"(35) and that in virtue of His absolute and universal primacy, Christ is the secondary efficient, final, and exemplary cause of all creation.

But this absolute primacy of Christ has important implications for the whole of theology. For if it is true, as St. Thomas says, that "the principle by which a thing exists is the same as that by which we know it,"(36) then Catholic theology cannot present a true picture of reality unless it is unified by the same principles which unify reality: proximately, Christ; and ultimately, God.

In fact, the Angelic Doctor seems to have implied this very conclusion when he said that "the whole Christ, as the head and the members" was the object of theology.(37) Nevertheless, he could not have developed this premise even if he had been aware of its implications, because Catholic theology was not yet ready for such a conclusion. As Fr. E. Mersch, S.J., explained, St. Thomas' contemporaries were not even agreed that God was the ultimate formal object of theology.(38) One of the Saint's major accomplishments was to make this fact clear, not only by explicit statement,(39) but even by the very structure of his masterpiece.(40)

What St. Thomas' position in history made it impossible for him to develop, however, was developed in succeeding ages by Franciscan theologians, who used as their starting point the profound insight shared by both St. Francis and St. Thomas: that Christ is the pivotal point of all creation. For the Christocentric theology of these Franciscans, which has borne rich fruit in our day,(41) is in full accord with the principles of St. Thomas.

These facts seem to warrant some kind of practical application, however; for our contemporary theology manuals do not yet reflect the Christocentrism which is filling less formal books and periodicals.

The time seems ripe, in other words, to draw the practical conclusion implied in the most basic principles of Thomism: to build upon the firm and solid foundations of St. Thomas a new theological synthesis unified by Christ, the priximate formal object of theology. The genuinely Thomistic spirit and the immeasurable value of such an undertaking are well described in two passages of Fr. Mersch:

> The declaration that Christ is the object of theology does not involve any departure from Thomistic orthodoxy, provided we understand it in such a way as to acknowledge that God as God is the ultimate object to which everything refers and leads.(42)

> Everything in Christianity comes from Christ; the intelligibility proper to Christianity ought also to come from Christ. All the mysteries have come to mankind through Christ or in view of Christ; the understanding that can be gained of these mysteries ought likewise to come from Him.(43)

Who would venture to estimate the immense good the Church would derive from such a unification of her doctrine? At last, Christ would be given the central position which must be His in a theology which bears the name Christian.

NOTES

(1) Col., 1:15-17.
(2) Col., 1:18.
(3) III Sent., I, 1, 3 (Parma, 1857), Vol. 8, p. 12.
(4) In I Tim., 1, 4 (Parma, 1862), Vol. 13, p. 590.
(5) S.T., III, 1, 3 (New York: Benziger, 1947), Vol. 2, pp. 2028-29.
(6) Fr. C. Urrutibéhéty, O.F.M., Christus Alpha et Omega seu de Christi universali regno (Lille: Giard, 1910), p. 30. We also believe that had St. Thomas taken a different (non-hypothetical) view of the question, his principles would have led him to seek different authorities in support of the opposite view. Many such authorities can be found in Fr. J. F.

Bonnefoy's posthumous La Primauté du Christ (Rome: Herder, 1959); 467 pages.

(7) Op. Ox., III, 7, 3 (Paris, 1894), Vol. 14, p. 348. There has been a controversy as to whether Duns Scotus expressed any opinion at all on the hypothetical question; see Fr. A. M. Caggiano, O.F.M., "De mente Ioannis Duns Scoti circa rationem Incarnationis," Antonianum, Vol. 32 (1957), pp. 311-34.

(8) Fr. J. F. Bonnefoy, O.F.M., "La primauté absolue et universelle de N.S. Jésus-Christ et de la T.S. Vierge," Bulletin de la société francaise d'études mariales, Vol. 4 (1938), p. 43.

(9) Idem, "L'Immaculée dans le plan divin," Ephemerides Mariologicae, Vol. 8 (1958), pp. 5-61; and "La place du Christ dans le plan divin de la création," Mélanges de science religieuse, Vol. 4 (1947), pp. 257-84, and Vol. 5 (1948), pp. 39-62.

(10) I Sent., d. 45, c. 4.

(11) Fr. D. J. Unger, O.F.M.Cap., "The Primary Reason for the Incarnation according to Father Roschini," Antonianum, Vol. 34 (1959), p. 431.

(12) Ps. 129:2.

(13) S.T., I, 48, 1, ad 5 (Vol. 1, p. 249).

(14) Ibid., i, 22, 1 (Vol. 1, p. 121).

(15) See Fr. Bonnefoy's "La place du Christ ...," p. 279.

(16) L. Molina, Concordia liberi arbitrii cum gratiae donis, q. 23, a. 5, disp. 1, m. 7 (Ulyssipone, 1588), p. 439.

(17) Fr. G. M. Roschini, O.S.M., Compendium Mariologiae (Rome, 1946), p. 367.

(18) Fr. J. Solano, S.J., "De Verbo Incarnato," Sacrae Theologiae Summa (Madrid: Editorial Catolica, 1953^2, Vol. 3, pp. 17-22 (nn. 7-11).

(19) Ibid., p. 19.

(20) John, 18:37.

(21) S.T., I, 44, 4 (Vol. 1, p. 232). Elsewhere, St. Thomas says, "Thus goodness, as a cause, is prior to being" (Ibid., I, 5, 2, ad 1 (Vol. 1, p. 24)). See J. Péghaire, "L'axiome 'bonum est diffusivum sui' dans le néoplatonisme et le thomisme," Rev. Univ. Ottawa, Vol. 1 (1932), section spéciale, pp. 5-30.

(22) S.T., I, 20, 4 (Vol. 1, p. 116).

(23) S.C.G., II, 44, 2 (tr. J. M. Anderson. Garden City: Image, 1955), Vol. 2, pp. 131-32. See also Fr. H. Lennerz, S.J., "De historia applicationis principii: 'omnis ordinate volens,'" Gregorianum, Vol. 10 (1929), pp. 238-66.

(24) S.T., I, 65, 3 (Vol. 1, p. 326).

(25) Ibid., I, 23, 4 (Vol. 1, p. 128).

(26) Ibid., III, 56, 1, ad 3 (Vol. 2, p. 2326).

(27) Ibid., in corp. (Vol. 2, p. 2325). The Angelic Doctor uses the same principle in two other places: In Post. Anal., I, 4 (Parma, 1865), Vol. 18, p. 92; and, explicitly with reference to Christ, SCG., IV, 27 (Vol. 4, p. 147).

(28) S. Bonav., I Sent., II, 2, 4 (ed. Quaracchi, Vol. 1, p. 53a). Fr. Bonnefoy has explained how efficient causality per modum meriti can be retroactive; see "La place du Christ ...," loc. cit. On the nature of exemplary causality and its connection with efficient causality, see J. Iturrioz, S.J., "Metaphysica generalis," Philosophiae scholasticae summa (Madrid: Editorial Catolica, 1957^2), Vol. 1, p. 848.

(29) See the following authors. In the spiritual life, Fr. Faber and St. Francis de Sales. In moral theology, Fr. Gilleman, S.J., The primacy of Charity in Moral Theology (Westminster: Newman, 1959). In dogmatic theology, Fr. E. Mersch, The Theology of the Mystical Body (St. Louis: Herder, 1951); Fr. F. Juergensmeier, The Mystical Body of Christ (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1954); and Fr. E. Mura, Le corps mystique du Christ (Paris: Blot, 1936). The Protestants have shown the same Christocentric trend; see O. Culmann, Christus und die Zeit (Zurich, 1946). And Christ's all pervading influence is being felt even in philosophy; see M. Blondel, La philosophie et l'esprit chretian (Paris, 1944). The late Pope Pius XII praised this work of Blondel in a letter written on December 2, 1944; see E. Longpre, La documentation catholique, Vol. 42 (1945), pp. 498-99.

(30) Fr. C. V. Heris, O.P., The Mystery of Christ (tr. D. Fahey. Westminster: Newman, 1958), p. 21.

(31) See St. Thomas' Summa, where he says: "The angels are subjects of Christ's judiciary power not only with regard to His divine Nature, as He is the Word of God, but also with regard to His human nature" (S.T., III, 59, 3 (Vol. 2, p. 2341)); and "Of His influence not only men but even angels partake" (Ibid., III, 8, 4 (Vol. 2, p. 2078)).

(32) "L'Immaculée dans le plan divin," loc. cit., pp. 28-31; see Luke, 24-26. A quite different, but equally good explanation of sin is given by Fr. E. Bettoni in his work, Nothing for Your Journey (tr. B. Malina, O.F.M., Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 1959), pp. 86-90.

(33) St. Thomas, II Sent., XV, 1, 1, ad 6 (Parma, 1856), Vol. 6, p. 513.

(34) "Propter ipsum Christum permissum est pecdatum originale" (Fr. Garrigou-Lagrange, O.P., "Motivum Incarnationis fuit motivum misericordiae," Angelicum, Vol. 7 (1930), p. 299).

(35) Fr. C. V. Heris, O.P., op. cit., p. 21.

(36) "Eadem enim sunt principia esse, rei et veritatis ipsius, ut patet ex II Metaphysicae" (In Post. Anal., I, 4 (Parma, 1865), Vol. 18, p. 90).

(37) S.T., I, 1, 7 (Vol. 1, p. 5).

(38) Fr. E. Mersch., S.J., op. cit., p. 60.

(39) "God is in very truth the object of this science" (S.T., I, 1, 7 (Vol. 1, p. 5)).

(40) See Mgr. G. Ceriani, Dottrina e vita del Corpo mistico (Venegono Infer., 1939), pp. 34-35.

(41) We do not mean to insist upon a direct causal influence in every case, of course, but the majority of the authors mentioned in note 29 (above) seem to have been influenced in at least an indirect way by Franciscan Christocentrism.

(42) Fr. E. Mersch., op. cit., p. 68.

(43) Ibid., p. 74.

BOOK REVIEWS

THE PRIMACY OF CHARITY IN MORAL THEOLOGY

Gerard Gilleman, S.J. tr.: William F. Ryan, S.J., and Andre Vachon, S.J. Newman, 1959, 420 pp. $5.50.

Although Catholic moralists are aware that natural morality is an abstraction, they have nevertheless permitted that abstraction to exercise a decisive influence upon their science. That is, they have concerned themselves for the most part with abstract entities--with what Fr. Gilleman has termed "partial realizations which emerge from the flowing stream of our profound (moral) tendency" (p. 78). But the author shows clearly that in the concrete no human act has any meaning (or can even exist) without being "informed" by love, which grace turns into charity. "It is necessary to determine an act by its explicit object, its circumstances, and its immediate ends, but these do not reveal its ultimate meaning and orientation" (p. 79).

Many important problems are studied in this work: e.g., the informing of every human virtue and act by love, the relationship between concupiscent and altruistic love, the true function of spiritual and pastoral theology. On this last point, incidentally, Frs. Ford and Kelly (Contemporary Moral Theology) observed that alone among all the progressive moralists they had consulted in the matter, Fr. Gilleman had succeeded in safeguarding the important distinction between degrees of obligation in precepts and counsels.

Certainly a high point of the study is Fr. Gilleman's treatment of death as the greatest of human acts. What the body cannot help undergoing, the soul, according to the author, should freely accept as its ultimate act of love. The "being-toward-death" of Heidegger thus takes on a real meaning in the light of Christian charity, for "the whole purpose of our life is to succeed in making this last act an act of perfect charity" (p. 227).

Basically, Fr. Gilleman has tried to do for moral theology what Fr. Mersch has done for dogma and Marcel and Sciacca for philosophy--return moral theology to an existential context and show that "our morality is, above all, a theology, and that our moral life is a participation in the very life of the Trinity in the charity of the Son" (p. 224).

But if Christocentrism is the true context of moral theology, why did St. Thomas write the Tertia Pars after the Secunda Secundae? Fr. Gilleman has given the only answer that can be given to this question: "The medieval mind used analysis as a didactic method" (p. 191). St. Thomas lived in an age which had just begun to turn the X-Ray of reason on the Christian Wisdom bequeathed it by St. Augustine. The Angelic Doctor brought this trend to its perfection, but at the same time, he always maintained a deep awe and reverence for the Wisdom of Augustine.

Yet one cannot help reflecting that, had St. Thomas lived after Descartes--after Hegel and Comet--had he been born and raised in a milieu surfeited with the sterile rationalism of these philosophers, he might have chosen quite another method of developing Augustinian theology. As Fr. Gilleman puts it,

> One might well regret that the Angelic Doctor was so exclusively preoccupied with the formal aspect and the particular laws of the virtues that he did not sufficiently emphasize the ends implicitly pursued by the subject, taken as a member of Christ, in the concrete context of the Christian universe centered on the Incarnation" (p. 191).

Nevertheless, when Fr. Gilleman suggests that whatever good there is in Scotism be "integrated . . . into a Thomistic metaphysical context" (p. 131), he raises some very difficult problems.

Basic to all these problems is the question of what makes a thesis "Thomistic." Is it merely compatibility with fundamental Thomism? It does not seem so, because too large a superstructure has been raised upon that foundation during past centuries. Fr. Gilleman has done a masterful job of basing his primacy-of-charity thesis upon solid Thomistic principles, as found in the Summa itself; but his thesis is not so easily inserted into the superstructure of modern Thomism.

One reason for this statement is the will-intellect question. Although J. Pieper (Happiness and Contemplation) has shown that it is naive to speak of a simple "primacy of intellect" in Thomism, as though the will had no part to play, still the same author makes it clear that for the Thomist the intellect must, in the final analysis, play the crucial role in human existence. But such a thesis seems incompatible with Fr. Gilleman's, which implies the primacy of the will as the faculty which exercises charity.

A more important difficulty arises from Fr. Gilleman's Thomistic treatment of the Incarnation. "The humanity of Christ exists wholly for the advantage of other persons" (p. 205) is one of the propositions the author uses to sum up his view of this Mystery. But such a view contradicts several basic metaphysical principles found in the works of St. Thomas himself. Our relationship to Christ is not that of a person toward something useful to him, but rather of a person toward his King, his final cause, his reason for being. We have been made for Christ, not Christ for us. In other words, a true understanding of Christ as our exemplar and center does necessarily imply the primacy of charity in moral theology, but that understanding is difficult to place within the context of modern Thomism--although that is not at all the case with the "Thomism" of St. Thomas.

Fr. Gilleman has done so excellent a job of proving his primacy-of-charity thesis to be solidly based on St. Thomas that his work will almost necessarily encourage many Thomists to reexamine their position on the will and on Christocentrism. The result may well be a synthesis far exceeding the wildest dreams of the Scholastic Age.

Technically, the book is good.

Particularly welcome was the separation of reference notes (at the end of the book) from content notes (at the foot of each page). The translation is at times (especially in the first two parts) excessively literal, but this fact as well as the unevenness of the print can probably be explained by the fact that the author himself corrected the proofs. Partly because of the poor English and partly because of the highly technical nature of the material, the first two sections (historical and speculative) of the book do seem less readable and less rewarding than the third (practical).

Despite such minor defects, however, The Primacy of Charity definitely deserves the attention of any priest interested in the future of theology. There is a real need for the "existentialization" of moral theology, and Fr. Gilleman's attempt to answer that need seems to be the best one to date.

--Fr. Michael D. Meilach, O.F.M.

SACRAMENTAL PRAYER

by Conrad Pepler, O.P.B., Herder Book Co. 1959. 148pp. $2.75

Sacramental Prayer--the title catches attention even more than a book on Sacramental Grace. A need exists for works on both subjects. The Catholic, Religious and laic, must have a keen appreciation of Sacramental realities. Because the Catholic by divine ordination lives in a sacramental atmosphere, the "Magnum Mysterium" of the Incarnation is continued for him in time and space by the Sacraments. His whole being, much less his prayer, is caught up in the great mystery of Christ by this seven-fold sharing of Divine Life. Spirituality, Spiritual Life, and all like expressions can only denote this: the building up and completion of the God-given plan of sanctification through the Sacraments. These Divine Realities are wonderfully fitted to man who is composed of the material and spiritual.

If the title is captivating, it is also misleading, at least to this reader. Certainly in his preface, Fr. Pepler states the case for Sacramental prayer and its urgency, but he immediately says that his will not be the long awaited synthesis which the title suggests. But the proof of the book is in the reading. Although the Author makes no attempts at systematic exposition, what he says is extremely valuable. The essays have about them a thread of intrinsic coherence. What should commend these essays to the sacerdotal reader is the pastoral need to explain the Paschal Mysteries to the people, which is demanded by the restored ordo of Holy Week. These sections are first rate.

Fr. Pepler sketches lightly the historical fluctuations of Liturgical emphasis in the Christian life. He cites causes that have brought us to our present position in the Liturgical Restoration. The Author's second essay concerns the interplay of body and spirit in worship and prayer with the stress on the external action affecting the soul. Fr. Pepler takes issue with Guardini over an ill-advised reproachment of suiting the Liturgy to man's needs. This, I feel, is a misrepresentation of Guardini's aim and view. Guardini seems more understanding of man in his modern milieu.

Two essays are of especial worth. The one on "Prayer and Penance" provides matter for lenten reflection of genuine theological value. Here, however, the Author seems to make unwarranted distinctions. He notes a fundamental Christian dicotomy--the Christian Humanist and the so-called Pauline ascetic. These two extremes the Sacraments must reconcile. But cannot the Christian Humanist find in the "whatsoever is good, whatsoever is beautiful, whatsoever is lovable" of St. Paul his charter par excellence? St. Paul is a sacramental theologian. The Author calls on him repeatedly in his essay on "The Sacrament of Faith." "The Sacrament of Prayer" comprises the kernel of this small collection of essays, and it alone would recommend the book from the sacramental aspect. The prayer of Calvary is the prayer of the Mass: "The Cross has summed up all these prayers of the Christian already, and to attempt, as it were, to bypass the praise and satisfaction of Christ in order to make these offerings on our own would be to deny the truth of the Incarnation and Redemption" (p. 11). Insights such as these and many others sprinkled throughout the book makes us hope that Father Pepler will undertake the synthesis he hopes "some theologian to tackle systematically." He has admirably qualified himself for that synthesis.

Brian Flynn, O.F.M.

THE MEANING AND MATTER OF HISTORY: A CHRISTIAN VIEW

by Rev. Martin Cecil D'Arcy, S.J. New York: Farrar, Straus and Cudahy Co., 1959. 309pp. $5.50.

Competence and interest make a handsome couple. These two are happily joined in Father D'Arcy's The Meaning and Matter of History. The author's professional competence as a philosopher is evident in his analyses of various philosophies of history. His professed interest in the philosophy of history, now styled "historicism," may well generate a like interest in those who read this Christian view of history.

The purpose of the author in this work is to focus the light of Revelation on history. The truths of Christianity are not introduced as proofs; they are offered as guides to the philosopher of history, the historicist. Suffering takes on a new meaning, for example, when viewed in the light of the Cross. The end of history assumes real importance when seen in the light of the Christian teaching on the end of the world. The author has before him a lofty aim. He pursues it with keen interest and professional competence.

The book opens with an explanation of a basic distinction: history and the philosophy of history. The historian, as such, differs necessarily from the philosopher of history. The one records historical data, the other interprets it. Some writers, like C. S. Lewis, contend that the task of the philosopher of history is impossible. This contention is later explained. "C. S. Lewis expressed himself entirely skeptical about the possibility of any historicism, as he calls it, because of our present and incurable lack of knowledge of the past and future" (p. 188). Father D'Arcy takes exception to this contention. He undertakes the task (and fulfills it) of proving that a philosophy of history is possible.

A weightier task is his effort to state the case for a philosophy of history that is Christian. He meets opposition in stating such a philosophy but he is not unprepared. Here we see the competence of the Christian philosopher. He advances solid

arguments to support his view. The arguments, e.g., for the Primacy or Headship of Christ, the teaching that all things in the orders of nature, grace, and glory have been created through and for the humanity of Christ, are not those of a visionary but of a capable Christian philosopher.

Father D'Arcy has given us a valuable explanation of Newman's "illative sense," which in turn is valuable for an understanding of history. He first cautions us that the term "sense" in Newman's phrase is not to be taken as in a "sense organ" but as in a "man of good sense" or "this makes sense." Is this not but a mastering of the obvious? Apparently not, for some have mistaken Newman on this point. Another point of far greater consequence is the statement that probabilities converge in certitude. This too, has been mistaken.

Newman followed popular usage in speaking of the "illative sense." So too in speaking of probabilities converging into certainty. "To be exact, however, probabilities are not objects of forces or realities which meet together and make something else" (p. 52). Real objects and one's thought of them are distinct. The distinction is subtle and seldom noticed because we often take for granted our knowledge of real events. The philosopher of history must be concerned with certitude: he must certify facts, or more correctly, he must become certain of facts. Facts have no certitude; minds have certitude. The epistemologist tells us that certitude is a subjective mental state. Ordinary usage is not as exact as the epistemologist. This is illustrated in our own experience for we say: "That probably happened; that certainly happened." The truth of the matter is that it either happened or did not happen.

When the historian has gathered all available and pertinent data, he sees that things fit in place. He has probability about some facts. As these are amassed, he sees that an event happened in such and such a way. The event cannot be explained except in this way because the evidence points to this way. The historian becomes certain. The solution has "clicked" in the historian's mind as does the solving of a crime in the mind of the detective. One last clue has formed a "link." With this "link" we have the "illative sense." Let Newman himself describe the process:

> It is by the strength, variety, or multiplicity of premises, which are only probable, not by well-connected syllogisms...by objections overcome, by adverse theories neutralized, by difficulties gradually clearing up, by exceptions proving the rule, by unlooked - for correlations found for received truths, by suspense and delay in the process issuing in triumphant re-actions -- by all these ways, and many others, the practised and experienced mind is able to make a sure divination that a conclusion is inevitable, of which his lines of reasoning do not actually put him in possession. (Newman, as quoted by D'Arcy, p. 55)

A good critique of various philosophies of history, one great value of this work, demands of the critic the understanding of those philosophies and the passing of a sound judgment on them. With his understanding of philosophies of history and history itself and with his balanced appraisal of various systems of historicism, Father D'Arcy fulfills these demands amply and admirably. His knowledge of many philosophies of history and allied studies is more than a passing acquaintance; it is an intimate familiarity. He penetrates to the heart of the matter in analyzing the teaching of the historicist Toynbee and the evolutionist Pere Teilhard de Chardin. Historicists of the past, like St. Augustine, Bossuet, and Vico, and of the present like Toynbee, Barth, and Tillich pass in review before the author, who inspects their views closely. Wholesale approval and wholesale condemnation yield to the more valuable and more discriminating judgment of good points and bad points. "The immediate and obvious merits of Toynbee's theory are that he seeks an answer to the meaning of history in what is peculiarly human" (p.112-113). "Toynbee, also, claims that his work is properly scientific. Nevertheless in his last volume, where he permits himself to be autobiographic, he tells us that he was inspired to write his history by the feelings he experienced one long summer's day as he sat 'musing on the summit of the citadel of Mistra,' near Sparta in the Peloponnese" (p. 116-117).

Many will want to read this book: the historian because of his interest in the interpretation of data, the philosopher because of his interest in history's tentativeness and universality, the Christian because of his interest in looking back on the past as a Christian and predicting the future as a Christian.

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CHRISTIANITY IN CONFLICT

John A. Hardon, S.J. Newman, 1959, 300 pp. $4.50.

"A Catholic View of Protestantism" is the subtitle and most accurate description of Fr. Hardon's second survey of Protestantism in America, Christianity in Conflict. A sequel to Protestant Churches of America, the present volume is intended by the author to supply a real need of Catholics to understand the differences which separate them from Protestants. Only when there is a realization of fundamental divergencies can there be a sound basis for tolerance, for Catholic-Protestant cooperation against agnostic secularism, and for any progress towards a true ecumenical movement. In the author's own words, "The present volume is neither a polemic defense of Catholicism nor a personal witness to the faith, but the more modest work of seeing the Protestant religion through Catholic eyes and giving the impressions accordingly" (p. xi). Throughout, the same general plan is traceable--a historical development of the doctrine of Luther and Calvin to its current manifestation in Protestant thought and practice, particularly, though not exclusively, in the United States.

As the result of adopting such a scheme, the author has made a valuable contribution to the library of any priest or seminarian. Just as no doctor would treat a physical disease without knowing its cause and development, the priest should know the spiritual disease he is combatting. For this it is not so necessary to know exactly what a particular sect holds, since the prospective convert may not know him-

self, as it is to know the general Protestant attitude towards marriage, birth control, religious education, and the like. There are certain general characteristics of Protestantism which are traceable as underlying themes pervading the entire work. Among these themes are: subjectivism, which the author considers the basic premise of Protestant thought; an underlying adherence to the principles of the Reformers; and, antithetical to the latter, a modern tendency to regain that which was lost in the Reformation.

Subjectivism is keenly presented as the underlying principle of Protestant thought in any particular sphere. Thus Fr. Hardon states:

> Protestant historians until modern times used to say there were two fundamental principles of the Reformation, an objective and subjective one. The former was the unique authority of Scripture, independent of tradition; the latter justification by faith alone without good works. While still considered important, these principles are now subordinated to a deeper issue from which they were both derived. Underlying them was the Protestant belief in the inspiration of the individual and the corresponding right of private judgment in matters of faith (p. 11f).

This is said in reference to private interpretation of Scripture, but the principle is evident elsewhere. "The title of 'minister' in the Protestant churches has more than a symbolic meaning; it designates the clergy as delegates of the congregation and nothing more" (p. 23). Cooperation among Protestant sects for missionary purposes is achieved above (or below) the doctrinal level, so that Protestant conversions can be measured by the numbers marching in a parade to commemorate the Presbyterian diamond jubilee, as was done in one Latin American country. The same principle is particularly apparent in the chapter devoted to doctrinal variations. Speaking of American Protestantism, the author states:

> Every possible form of discord is apparent and frankly admitted. On the broadest level, the churches differ in their official statements of doctrine; within denominations of the same family are further varieties; periodically the churches change their professions of faith and repudiate what previously had been required belief; most vacillating are the teachings of churchmen and theologians, normally at variance among themselves and opposed to what their their churches profess, while remaining in good standing in the ministry or representing very institutions they oppose (p. 183f).

Despite the subjectivism which has characterized Protestantism, the particular tenets of the heresiarchs are shown to have had their effect. Thus the current divorce rate in the United States of one in four marriages is traced to Luther's rejection of the indissolubility of the marriage bond and to the thesis, "marriage is a purely civil affair, subject only to civil authority like clothing, food and lodging" (p. 69). If human nature is so corrupted that every act is sinful, then the marriage act is sinful of itself and it is meaningless to speak of sin in the prevention of birth. If God saves man in spite of himself, as Calvin taught, and human cooperation in the work of salvation is a characteristic of paganism, it is but a step to say that no natural barriers (such as race) established by God are to be traversed. Thus the Calvinist Dutch Reformed Church of South Africa rationalizes the apartheid system.

Frequently, however, an opposite tendency appears--an effort to regain what has been lost. Thus the four books of the New Testament rejected by Luther are now accepted without qualification, and the deuterocanonical books of the Old Testament are recognized as "indispensable" for understanding the New Testament. Though Calvin compared the sacredness of marriage to that of shoemaking, ministers are now instructed to treat marriage as "almost a sacrament." Although Luther inveighed against the vow of chastity, the Augustana Synod of the Lutheran Church in America organized a community of religious to follow the rule of St. Augustine. Nowhere is this redeeming tendency more apparent than in the chapter devoted to the Protestant desire for unity. This chapter is invaluable in the light of the forthcoming Vatican Council for an understanding of the differences between Catholic unity based on oneness of creed, code, cult, and Protestant unity based on a nebulous something called "fellowship."

Without intending in any way to disparage the quality of the volume as a whole or to accuse the author of more than one inaccuracy, this reviewer was, nonetheless, surprised to read in the first chapter, treating of the contents of the Protestant Bible: "For a thousand years, Jerome's opinion (that the deuterocanonical books were not inspired) remained a historical relic, contradicted by the stream of patristic tradition and a series of papal declarations, until popularized by Martin Luther to serve his own polemic ends." (p. 8). Although St. Jerome certainly was contradicted by the stream of patristic tradition and a series of papal declarations, one can hardly term St. Jerome's opinion a historical relic in the sixteenth century. Even a glance at A Catholic Commentary on Sacred Scripture shows an early name like Pope St. Gregory the Great or late names like Cardinal Ximenes and Cardinal Cajetan on the opposite tack, whereas "During the Middle Ages the divergence of opinion was even more pronounced, important ecclesiastical writers being found both for and against the complete authority of the full Canon" (op. cit. p. 18). If only a "relic," it was certainly well enshrined.

The final chapter, "The Meaning of Protestantism," is a valuable general treatment of modern Protestantism and should certainly be read if the rest of the volume is used only for reference. A bibliography is lacking but the work is fully annotated. Of no little importance in evaluating the volume is the fact that, "with rare exception, only Protestant sources were used," be they Luther, Calvin, Pike, Oxnam, Blanshard, or Niebuhr. Christianity in Conflict is an objective view of American Protestantism, and hence, of value for any American priest.

"We ought to honor and venerate all theologians and those who minister the most holy word of God as those who minister to us spirit and life."

From the Testament of Our Holy Father
St. Francis